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INTRODUCTION
Criminal law systems throughout the world have evolved to a stage
where they no longer ask, "What is the appropriate role of the victim in
a criminal trial?" The questions now relate to the scope of the victim's
rights, in which procedures she has independent standing, and at what
stage she should be heard.' The process of the "prosecution stepping
into the victim's shoes," whereby the state controls the entire criminal
process, seemingly on behalf of the victim, has been replaced by the
recognition that the interests of the prosecution (the State) are not al-
ways consistent with those of the victim.2 The view that will be
developed here as the main thesis of this Article, that victims should be
heard at the sentencing stage, irrespective of their views, is far from
common. This Article will first establish the theoretical basis for this
view by drawing on an expressive theory, discussed in Part I, and will
take this theory a step further, into the sphere of the particular victim
who asks for leniency.
The friction between the various interests represented in the crimi-
nal process frequently comes to the fore at the sentencing stage and is
reflected in the sentence itself. The sentencing stage is not just the cul-
mination of a criminal process; it may be viewed as the distillation of
the entire criminal process. The harm to the victim is weighed against
the assailant's personal profile as well as the public interest, and the out-
come may be a call for retribution, prevention, deterrence or even
1. For the view that victim involvement in the criminal justice process is becoming the
reality and that its opponents should consider methods of incorporating the victims'
views while simultaneously minimizing the violation of defendants' rights, see Erin
Ann O'Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 229, 235-
39 (2005) (analyzing the political power wielded by the coalition of victims' rights
bodies and presenting a comprehensive historical survey of victim involvement in
proceedings). For literature on the subject of sentencing as a political statement and
the relationship between the legislature and public opinion, see Paul Butler, Retribu-
tion, for Liberals, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1873 (1999).
2. For more on the victim's right to express his position in a federal proceeding, see,
e.g., Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2004). For the importance of lis-
tening to the victim in crucial stages, see JONATHAN DOAK, VICTIMS' RIGHTS, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: RECONCEIVING THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTIES 207-
40 (2008).
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rehabilitation.' Further, the sentencing process is usually not subject to
the evidentiary rules that govern the entire criminal process in different
criminal justice systems.' At the sentencing stage, evidence may be in-
troduced that would otherwise be excluded under statutory evidence
law, including an impact statement by the victim.' Moreover, even in
those states that have adopted sentencing guidelines, the sentencing
stage is often still a function of judicial discretion. Thus, it is important
to consider restrictions that may apply to the victim's statement, follow-
ing from procedural safeguards, even where strict evidentiary rules do
not apply. Can the victim independently initiate a statement of her posi-
tion, and to what extent may the court take her concerns or status into
account as distinct from "damage" that characterizes victims of this na-
ture? Should the victim be restricted to merely describing her damages,
or should she also be entitled to express her view regarding the appro-
priate sentence?
3. It could be argued that at the trial stage in the criminal process, before the determina-
tion of guilt, the central interests are those of the state and the defendant. The
principal public interest is in the non-conviction of the innocent and due process of
law. As such, even enthusiastic supporters of victims' rights agree that victim in-
volvement at this stage need not be significant, in order to avoid the possibility of
false convictions. On the other hand, the victim should be involved at the sentencing
stage. See Steven Eisenstat, Revenge, Justice, and Law: Recognizing the Victim's Desire
for Vengeance as a Justification for Punishment, 50 WAYNE L. REv. 1115, 1165-66
(2005).
4. For the history and a critical view of this situation on the Federal level, see Deborah
Young, Fact-Finding at Federal Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should Meet the Rules,
79 CORNELL L. REv. 299 (1993-1994). For the UK situation and the importance of
discretion, see ANDREw ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 41 (Cam-
bridge, 5th ed. 2010).
5. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-51 (1949) ("[M]odern concepts
individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing
judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement
of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial.").
6. For example, in states that have adopted sentencing guidelines, the sentencing is
based on the meta-principle of a commensurate relationship between the severity of
the act, the culpability of the defendant, and the severity of the sentence. This appar-
ently indicates acceptance of the retributive theory as the basis of the law. The Model
Penal Code incorporates the transition from the rehabilitation approach to the retri-
bution approach. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING PLAN (2002). Both federal and
state law prescribe an independent right for the victim to be heard at different stages
of the proceeding, including at the sentence stage. Crime Victims' Rights Act, supra
note 2 ("The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court
involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.") (emphasis added). Even
in the jurisdictions that have not adopted the law, a number of states' courts have
recognized this right. Military courts have also recognized this right. See, e.g., United
States v. Stephens, 67 M.J. 233 (C.A.A.F. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 139 (2009).
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Traditionally, the victim's point of view is regarded only in the con-
text of pushing for severity in sentencing. We are accustomed to
hearing the protests of crime victims against the lenient punishments of
"their" defendants and against plea bargains that appear to be acts of
kindness to the defendants.! Different legal systems took one step to-
wards recognition of the relevance of pleadings relating to concrete
damage by expanding the avenues for compensation based either upon
the criminal proceeding or the criminal injury itself.9 The standing of a
victim as a proponent for harsher sentencing is a matter which is far
from simple, yet we shall focus on a matter which is even tougher: the
standing of a victim who requests leniency.o Thus, how should the court
7. Whiteley too notes that the majority of philosophers who deal with the justification
of punishment have failed to discuss the justification for hearing the victim with re-
gard to the punishment, insofar as they see the victim as nothing more than "an agent
for revenge." Diane Whiteley, Crime and Punishment, SIMON FRASER NEWS (Feb. 4,
1999), http://www.sfu.calarchive-sfunews/sfnews/ 1 999/Feb4/opinion.html. For just
one of the many examples attesting to the almost automatic equation that being a vic-
tim is equivalent to a desire for severe and draconian punishment, see Heidi M.
Hurd, Punishment and Crime: Expressing Doubts About Expressivism, 2005 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 405, 408 (2005). For writing that invokes this argument as a basis for op-
posing the submission of a victim's declaration to the court, given its underlying
motive of revenge, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS'
RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 177, 198 (1995). While Fletcher believes that the vic-
tim's interests should be integrated into the theory of retribution, he stresses that in
the absence of procedural rules at the sentencing stage, the judge may allow "every-
one" to have their say, something which he opposes. His proposal to hear the victim
at the pre-trial stage or during the trial itself ignores the reality that most indictments
are closed following a confession or plea bargain. The result is that failure to allow the
victim to be heard regarding the punishment means that she will not be heard at all.
8. Terms such as "pathetic sentence" and "joke justice" for describing lenient sentencing
are frequently used. See, e.g., Family Slam 'Pathetic' Sentence After Drunk Smashes Up
Their Home, THIS IS STAFFORDSHIRE (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.thisisstaffordshire.co.uk/
leek/news/Family-slam-pathetic-sentence-drunk-smashes-home/article-1610 4 82-
detaillarticle.html; Tony Koch and Padraic Murphy, Child Rape Sentence 'Pathetic', THE
AUSTRALIAN (Dec. 10, 2007), http://www.theaustralian.com.aulnews/child-rape-sentence-
pathetic/story-e6frg6oo-1 11115072997.
9. In many countries, schemes for compensation have been created. See, e.g., CANADIAN
RESOURCE CENTRE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, Compensation, http://www.crcvc.calen/
compensation.php (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
10. Sentencing literature frequently stresses that the reasons for recognizing mitigating
and aggravating circumstances may differ in accordance with the varying nature of
the sentence. See, e.g., Tatjana Hornle, Distribution of Punishment: The Role ofa Vic-
tim's Perspective, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 175, 196 (1999). In contrast to the standing
of a victim who requests leniency, which has not been discussed in the sentencing lit-
erature, there is a body of literature concerning the relationship of remorse and
apology to punishment. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Inte-
grating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85 (2004); Jeffrie
G. Murphy, Repentance, Punishment, and Mercy, in REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE
[Vol. 18:423426
act when those belonging to a defined group deemed worthy of special
protection, namely, victims of intimate partner violence, seek leniency
for their partners?" The problem highlighted here is the relationship
between the public interest and victims' private interest. How should the
tension which may result from the conflict between the interests of the
individual victim who advocates leniency be reconciled with the inter-
ests of the "collective" victims-the sector of women suffering from
domestic violence?
Part I establishes a general theoretical framework that supports
granting a voice to every victim at the sentencing stage as an obligation
of the legal system. We derive this obligation to the victim and society
from a sentencing theory that attributes importance to the message
transmitted by the criminal trial, the feelings evoked by the injury, and
the ensuing punishment. We imbue this expressive theory with a new
interpretation and argue that the only feasible conclusion is that any
subjective victim's view should be heard and taken into account. We
shall also briefly consider alternative proceedings in criminal law that
prima facie provide a worthy solution that respects the female victim.
Proceeding to the specific offense of spousal violence," Part II pre-
sents a synopsis of the psycho-social background required for an
understanding of the unique character of crimes of domestic violence.
This discussion will offer the background to our proposed comprehen-
sive solution, informed by a feminist analysis of dilemmas posed by
domestic violence. These dilemmas arise from a tension between pater-
nalism and the desire to protect women on the one hand, and the
recognition of women's autonomy and free choice on the other hand.
This tension gives rise to a number of fundamental questions which will
be discussed.'
PERSPECTIVE 143, 148-51 (Amitai Etzioni & David E. Carney eds., 1997); Austin
Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility and Criminal Punishment: An Analysis of Popular Cul-
ture, in THE PASSIONS OF LAw 168, 168-72 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
11. In our view, intimate violence presents the most complicated situation of all possible
violent scenarios, in terms of the respective positions of the victim and the assailant.
This Article focuses on the relationship between the victim and the assailant within
the spousal relationship only. While there are a number of points of similarity com-
mon to familial relationships, the spousal relationship is unique insofar as it is the
product of the parties' free choice, which over time becomes an ambivalent and com-
plex connection in which the element of freedom in its most profound sense is
occasionally deeply debased.
12. For convenience we will refer to these offenses as "domestic violence offenses," de-
spite the fact that in this Article they cover the complete gamut of situations involved
in the spousal relationship.
13. See infra Part Ill.
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In Part III we present our own approach, a complex feminist view,
which rejects the adoption of a dichotomous perspective found in cur-
rent literature that recognizes only two diametrically opposed positions
for describing a woman's autonomy and her freedom of choice. That
perspective fails to explain the complex reality that characterizes life in
the shadow of violence; instead, we propose the adoption of a resolu-
tion-sensitive model that recognizes a scale of situations that reflect the
actions of women functioning in situations of partial autonomy. We
argue that in each case there must be an examination of the subjective
position of the woman and the underlying motives of her request for
leniency in sentencing, having consideration for the nature of the spous-
al relationship and the woman's inner world. Based on this approach we
attempt to derive a solution appropriate for a multi-dimensional model
that takes a pluralistic approach to female typology. We propose a prac-
tical tool for examining the question-a modus operandi for receiving
the report on the victim (Victim Report). Familiarity with the woman's
inner world through a comprehensive victim report is likely to facilitate
an understanding of the motivation behind her request for leniency.
Thus, a comprehensive victim report will help the victim herself (a goal
in itself, particularly according to principles of therapeutic jurispru-
dence), improve the criminal justice system, and contribute to
socio-legal research.
The importance of this Article's thesis is twofold. First, it will con-
tribute to the developing body of theoretical writing in the area of
victims' rights and the idea of therapeutic jurisprudence. Second, this
Article will contribute to the practical aspect of victims' rights as it rec-
ommends a tool, the Victim Report, to solve the truly difficult dilemma
of how best to present the victim's view to the court (once it has been
determined that this step is crucial). The proposed solution demon-
strates the advantages to be gained by integrating therapeutic tools into
the fabric of the legal system.
I. THE ROLE OF THE VICTIM IN THE SENTENCING PROCESS
A. The Victim's Views Among Other Sentencing Considerations
Initially, we shall present what we believe to be the appropriate the-
oretical framework both for justifying punishment and for determining
the level of punishment and the victim's role in this determination. This
discussion is vital because even those in favor of giving victims standing
at the sentencing stage are not united in their approach; significant dif-
428 [Vol. 18:423
ferences exist among the various theories and models designed to safe-
guard this standing.
In the classical model, criminal law represented the public interest
whereas tort law was seen as the appropriate way to recover private dam-
ages." Classical theories focused on the conceptual need to punish the
wrongdoer for his wrongdoings." Accordingly, it is almost impossible to
find separate references to the views of the victim in the voluminous
literature dealing with the justification for particular sentences in crimi-
nal law; in this context there is no distinction among models offering a
theoretical justification for sentences, such as retribution or utilitarian-
ism. In general, no attention is paid to the past or future condition of
the specific victim." Another factor routinely rejected by authors writing
about sentencing is emotion; they focus on cognition instead." After
14. See, e.g, People v. Harvest, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 135, 139 (2000) ("The purposes of the
criminal law are protecting society, deterring future criminality, and punishing crimi-
nality already committed . . . . Compensation is the defining feature of civil law.")
(emphasis added).
15. There are still those who believe that providing the victim with standing during the
sentencing stage, including determining the award of compensation, might lead to a
collapse of the criminal law into tort law. See Michael Moore, Victims and Retribu-
tion: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 Bur. Crum. L. REv. 65, 66 (1999).
16. Thus, the retribution theories focused on the abstract need to counterbalance harm
by giving the wrongdoer his due punishment, without reference to the specific victim
or the latter's attitude towards the sentence. See George P. Fletcher, The Place of Vic-
tims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CluM. L. REv. 51, 54 (1999). Particularly
interesting is Moore's article, supra note 15, in which he explains why specific victims
must be disregarded within the framework of the retributive theory. From his point
of view, the victim is only tied to the justification of punishment by supplying the
content of the moral norms which, when violated, form a criminal offense. Yet this
does not give the victim any procedural rights. Utilitarian theories (or consequential-
ist theories) concentrate on social utility; however, they too disregard the status of the
victim as well as the relationship between society and the victim. This attitude is also
evident in complex theories, such as Hart's, which also ignores the victim. See H.L.A.
Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSI-
BILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 1-27 (1968). Likewise, theories that
emphasize specific wrongdoers, such as the rehabilitative theory and the theory of
moral education by means of punishment, refer to the particular wrongdoer but not
to the particular victim. See, e.g., Berryl G. Thompson, The Justification, Purposes and
Functions of Punishment in Our Domestic Society, 26 S.U. L. REv. 265 (1999). One
theory that does emphasize the victim is that of corrective justice, or the restorative
theory, which often leads to alternative solutions outside of criminal law. One
exception in the effort to integrate the victim's voice (even if not in the context of
pre-sentencing arguments) within the retribution theory may be found in Fletcher's
writings.
17. Removing emotion from the literature dealing with sentencing theories is largely the
result of the assumption that emotion and rationality compete with each other and
that "objective" judgments must be based on "logical" rational thinking, or at most
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many years of searching for the justification for punishment, emotion is
treated with contempt and is seen as something to be disregarded unless
it can be wrapped under the mantle of "moral concepts," as in Ben-
tham's use of the concept of retribution which may include anger.
Accordingly, literature dealing with punishment theory often sweepingly
dismisses the negative feelings of victims towards their abusers as "vin-
dictiveness" or "vengefulness." The desire for revenge is portrayed as an
ignoble, immoral emotion that should not be included among sentenc-
ing considerations."
One relevant sentencing theory-the expressive theory-
emphasizes the messages conveyed by actions and legal processes. This
concept recognizes the offense as conveying a negative message for the
victim and society, and the sentence as a means of reflecting the con-
demnation of the wrongdoer. The sentence also serves as an outlet for
feelings such as jealousy, resentment, and anger harbored by society and
upon a reasoned moral response, but never on emotions in view of the fact that they
are supposedly biased, subjective, and prima facie irrelevant. See Ariel Meirav, Al
Limud Me'toch Sevel [On Learning fom Suffering], 10 PLILIM 447, 449-50 (2001)
(Isr.); Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs: Two Narrative Problems at Criminal Trial,
in LAw's STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAw 135, 144, 147 (Peter
Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
18. For a discussion of Whiteley's writing regarding "moral sentiments," see infra note
28. For example, H.L.A. Hart refused to see the condemnation or denouncement of a
crime as justification for a punishment, on the ground that the criminal law de-
nounced the act by incriminating it. Hart, supra note 16. In taking this position,
Hart disregarded the particularist nature of the criminal offense while focusing solely
on the broad social and impersonal context of criminal legislation, which addresses
society in its entirety, including all abusers and all victims. This is understandable if
we recall Hart's reluctance to recognize the strong ties between the criminal law and
morality. For an analysis of Jeremy Bentham's moral retribution as distancing itself
from "anger or another passion and does not seek revenge, but justice," see Thomp-
son, supra note 16, at 270-71.
19. It would seem that the use of alternative words sometimes functions as a type of
"word laundromat." For example, in English we see an unwillingness to identify "re-
tributive" with "vengeance" or "revenge." Kyron Huigens, On Commonplace
Punishment Theory, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437, 441 (2005), (explaining the main
principles of the deontological theory, emphasizing that "this duty [to punish the
wrongdoer], of course, has nothing to do with vengeance. Retribution as an end of
punishment is the restoration of a proper balance - of benefits and burdens and of
dignity - between the offender, the victim and society."). Even the victims' move-
ment seeks to distance itself from the image of a movement that calls for the statutory
entrenchment of the desire for vengeance. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Getting Even: The Role
of the Victim, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 685 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds.,
1995). See also Moore, supra note 15, at 67 (providing a critical approach to the writ-
ings of Murphy, who turns the criminal legal system into "a moral mechanism for
vengeance").
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the victim. 20 Nonetheless, even the supporters of this theory have gener-
ally failed to discuss the voice of the specific victim or the spectrum of
possible emotions potentially stirred up by a crime. Instead, they have
seen it as a public catharsis," a condemnation on behalf of those in
whose name the sentence is imposed and the social consequence of the
crime.22 As William DeFord notes, importance attaches to the fact that
these writers speak of expressivism and not of communication--one
aspect of communication is that it entails the transmission of messages
between all involved parties, while expressivism is restricted to a one-
b . 23
way message being sent.
The lack of reference to the individual victim in the expressive the-
ory is surprising, considering the changing perceptions regarding
victims' roles. The increasing acknowledgement of the victim as a person
who can no longer be ignored in the criminal process and whose role is
not purely that of a witness has given rise to the concomitant question:
how much weight should be given to the victim's views, emotions, and
wishes in sentencing considerations in the criminal trial?24 Avoiding the
question by referring the victim to civil proceedings or even to alterna-
tive processes is seen as an improper way of getting rid of the victim
without according her the justice she deserves through the criminal pro-
cess, and perhaps even causing harm to the public, which may expect
20. JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY
649 (1970). Feinberg notes that if these aggressive emotions do not find release
through punishment, they will demand satisfaction in a manner that is socially harm-
ful. The expressivists also follow diverse approaches. For an analysis of the different
forms of the "vengeance theory" see Thompson, supra note 16, at 272. William
DeFord argues that the expressivist theories provide political rather than moral justi-
fications for punishment. The punishment must be expressive and reflect the public's
feelings regarding the sentence. William DeFord, The Dilemma of Expressive Punish-
ment, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 843, 845 (2005).
21. The term "public catharsis" as a goal of punishment is taken from Huigens, supra
note 19, at 439.
22. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 104 (mentioning the voice of the victim, albeit
not as a vital element). See also R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS (1986). See al-
so Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy ofDisgust in Criminal Law, 96 MIcH. L REv. 1621
(1998) (reviewing WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST (1997)) (dis-
cussing punishment having the function of reflecting the repugnance of the
community, i.e., the "emotions of the community" and not the emotions of individ-
uals).
23. DeFord, supra note 20, at 846.
24. For text and literature, see supra note 1. In this context, we may mention the argu-
ment regarding the use of victim impact statements. See, e.g., Edna Erez, Who's Afraid
of the Big Bad Victim? Victim Impact Statements as Victim Empowerment and En-
hancement ofJustice, 1999 Cim. L. REv. 545; Ian Edwards, The Place of Victims'
Preferences in the Sentencing of "Their" Offenders, 2002 Cim. L. REv. 689.
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consideration to be given to the victim. 25 Indeed, in recent years there
has been a developing debate as to whether it is appropriate to give the
victim an independent voice during the sentencing stage, and if so, how
best to define her status: whether as a witness to the damage (the "soft
version") only, or as one entitled to express her opinion as to the appro-
priate sentence (the "extreme version"). 26 As noted, prevailing sentencing
theories that ignore the victim are incompatible with the latter view and
a different theory that will allow the victim's voice to be heard is re-
quired.
Diane Whiteley's scholarship provides a theoretical foundation for
this Article. Whiteley's theory draws on concepts from expressivist litera-
ture such as the centrality of communication in the writings of Dan M.
Kahan, while also considering the subjective dimension of a particular
victim. 27 Thus, it is possible to view Whiteley's position as supplement-
ing existing sentencing theories and not as replacing them. Whiteley
bases the need to listen to the victim and consider her views among oth-
er sentencing considerations on the "moral sentiments" which the
recognized victim and community feel as a result of the crime. 28 Accord-
ing to Whiteley, erasing emotion from theoretical thinking about
criminal law action and justifications discounts very significant factors.29
25. For our arguments against alternative processes in the context of domestic violence
offenses, see infra Part I.B. For the fact that victims cannot obtain recourse from the
laws of tort, see Eisenstat, supra note 3, at 1121-22. Eisenstat notes that in practice
the possibility of instituting a tort action is illusory because of prescription, the
wrongdoer's lack of resources, unwillingness on the part of the victim to receive
"blood money," and other reasons. See generally Eisenstat, supra note 3.
26. For examples of supporters, see Erez, supra note 24, at 546. For opponents, who fear
turning the victims into "punishment agents," see Andrew Ashworth, Victims'Rights,
Defendants' Rights and Criminal Procedure, in INTEGRATING A VICTIM PERSPECTIVES
WITHIN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 185-203 (Adam Crawford & Jo Goodey eds., 2000).
27. For the centrality of the understanding of the crime and punishment as forms of
communication in which the wrongdoer expressed his lack of respect for values, see
Kahan, supra note 22, at 1641.
28. Diane Whiteley, The Victim and the Justification ofPunishment, 17 CRIM. Jus. ETH-
Ics 42, 46 (1998) ("A moral sentiment ... is a complex emotion that involves a
belief, an evaluation, and a relation to action."). For the purposes of this Article, we
interpret Whiteley's remarks as supportive of an expressivist non-radical theory, a
theory which is also consistent with other punishment theories. Punishment may also
embody such values as utilitarian justifications or retribution concurrently with the
communicational value.
29. Id. at 46. For the argument that reason and emotion are interdependent and that an
attempt to "purge" the legal process of emotional influences is fundamentally mistak-
en, see Gewirtz, supra note 17, at 144-45, and his references to the writings of
Martha Nussbaum, who argues that the two cannot be simply separated. MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIc LIFE 63-67
(1995). We should further note that in recent years there have been articles drawing
[Vol. 18:423432
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To a degree, Whiteley bases her theory on the influential remarks of
Peter Strawson, who asserts that attaching responsibility to another is
inextricably tied to expressions of resentment, anger, pain, gratitude,
support, and the like.30 As Whiteley asserts, it is arguable that the ex-
pression of a view per se carries decisive weight irrespective of whether
or not it will lead to a change in the object at which it is directed." In
our context, if a woman is capable of expressing her discontent with the
behavior of a spouse, this expression carries weight even without a
change in his behavior. In terms of our discussion, we are, of course,
referring to the expression of a view through sentencing in a criminal
trial.
A crime gives rise to grave moral sentiments for the victim and the
community. These are legitimate emotions and must be acknowledged
within the framework of the trial. The victim, the community, and the
wrongdoer are all interested parties in the sentencing and target audi-
ences for communication. According to Whiteley, sentencing is not only
a means of social regulation but also a type of personal communication
with the wrongdoer that expresses these moral concepts.3 2 The punish-
ment may not only reflect the desire for general or personal deterrence,
but also provide a way for the victim to cope, wage war, express recogni-
tion of her suffering, or express the level of repugnance felt by society
for the offense. Thus, it is also possible to link these goals to the theory
attention to such concepts as "motive," "emotion," and "passion" at the earlier stage
of determining criminal culpability. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental
States, 72 B.U. L. REv. 463 (1992); SAMUEL PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING
THE LAW OF MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER 88-161 (1998).
30. See Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSI-
BILITY 45 (John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza eds., 1982); FREE WILL 59-80 (G.
Watson ed., 1982); Andrew Eshleman, Moral Responsibility, in THE STANFORD EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2004), available at http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/moral-responsibility/.
31. For an analysis of the importance of this in Strawson's theory, see Jonathan Bennett,
Accountability, in PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS: ESSAYS PRESENTED TO P.F. STRAWSON
(Zak Van Straaten ed., 1980), available at www.earlymoderntexts.com/jfb/
accounta.pdf. It should be emphasized that Bennett makes no mention whatsoever of
the victim but only of the wrongdoer and whether he is "accountable" and what con-
ditions have to be satisfied for him to be held culpable. At the same time, Bennett
certainly refers to the outcome of the expression as essential to criminal punishment.
Bennett starts with the retributivist theory, but he concludes with the statement that
even if one takes into account the expression of reactive approaches, this has to be
done within a consequentialist (utilitarian) framework, i.e., in no circumstances is a
wrongdoer to be punished if no benefit could be gained as a result. Id.
32. The legal rituals of imposing criminal liability, conviction, and sentencing are fun-
damentally ascribing guilt, and in many cases (particularly when the crimes lead to a
sentence of imprisonment) of denunciation which tags a person with a negative label.
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of the therapeutic ramifications of the criminal process." In contrast to
writers holding more extreme views such as Eisenstat, who proposed
that vengeance be recognized as a legitimate justification for punish-
ment, Whiteley distances herself from the concept of vengeance,
notwithstanding her emphasis on emotion.34 Whiteley distinguishes
between resentment-a moral emotion which may be justified-and
vindictiveness; while feelings of vengeance should be kept out of the
ambit of the law, the law should take into account justified moral sen-
timents." The reason for this lies in the nature of "moral sentiments"
and their character as highly complex types of emotion.36 These are not
emotions which embody purely corporeal feelings, such as fear, but ones
that integrate cognitive and emotional elements and express a
worldview, an evaluation of reality, and a response to it. It is this norma-
tive base that justifies them. These "moral sentiments" are rational and
"justified."" Resentment, stirred up by the offense, is justified because it
is based on a concept of having been unjustifiably hurt by another per-
son, a wrong that demands rectification.
Upon shifting from an examination of the facts to an examination
of emotions and interpersonal communications, it becomes clear that
causing harm, such as the harm caused by the abusive spouse, is intend-
ed to send messages such as "you do not count to me" and "I am
33. For literature regarding the therapeutic effect of the process, see DAVID B. WEXLER &
BRUCE J. WINICK, EDS., LAw IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEU-
TIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg, Sexual Assault Victims-
Empowerment or Re-victimization? The Need for a Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model, in
TRENDS & ISSUES IN VICTIMOLOGY 150-74 (Natti Ronel, K. Jaishankar & Moshe
Bensimon eds., 2008).
34. See Eisenstat, supra note 3, at 1115. According to Eisenstat, vengeance per se is not
immoral or unjust. The desire for retribution against someone who has caused injury
is moral. If the sentence (which has the effect of causing suffering to the defendant) is
proportional to the damage caused, this is a worthy outcome of the criminal offense,
as is hearing the voice of the victim regarding the appropriate sentence. According to
Eisenstat, the fact that the state has taken over the morality of the criminal trial does
not stem from a moral concept but rather from practical considerations (including
ending the circle of retribution). Accordingly, there is no inherent principal to im-
pede including the victim's concerns and wishes in this system. Eisenstat suggests a
variety of possibilities for introducing the victim's voice during the sentencing stage,
including transferring the sentencing decision to him-a radical but possible solution
in a legal system in which there are serious restrictions in the form of sentencing
guidelines, Eisenstat, supra note 3, at 1174.
35. Whiteley, supra note 28.
36. See Richard Posner, The Problematics ofMoral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1637, 1649 (1998).
37. Whiteley, supra note 28. According to Whiteley, "vengeance," which is "merely a
passion," is recognized by its disproportionate intensity and unwillingness to take
facts and circumstances into account.
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exploiting you for my own ends."38 In cases of domestic violence, the
messages will usually be very clear. In these cases the acts are usually de-
liberate." Occasionally, violent men state their message explicitly, using
such phrases as "teach her a lesson" and "show her what's what." Similar-
ly, the woman will analyze the acts of her partner and their significance
for her,40 a significance which will not be as clear to a bystander as to the
woman who is well-versed in the private language of communication
between herself and her partner. By listening to the victim, the judge
will learn about the messages that she received from the assailant and
about their significance for the abuse. When she narrates her suffering,
her voice as the victim is heard. The judge, taking her view into consid-
eration, may therefore come to understand which values in her life were
compromised, and the judge's decisions may reflect this understanding.
This means that the utility of victim testimony is dependent on a judge's
individual determinations and willingness to understand her story. Nev-
ertheless, this is a satisfactory solution-even if not ideal-and it will
require some education and possibly even review. This point is of su-
preme importance in the model that we propose, as we shall explain
below.
As mentioned, the victim's sentiment should be present in the legal
process. From the point of view of the community, even if the public
sentiment is weaker than that of the victim herself, the moral repug-
nance for the acts of the assailant contains a normative element-
justification of the sense of repugnance felt by the victim. This is a
complex sentiment, which interweaves a cognitive perception of the
immorality of the assailant with an evaluation of the response of the vic-
tim.. In many criminal offenses, the assailant asserts his view that the
moral value of the victim is inferior or nonexistent.42 The absence of a
38. Whiteley, stupra note 28.
39. Hurd, Punishment and Crime, supra note 7, at 420 (arguing that the majority of
crimes fail to meet Austin's criteria for significant communication of illocutionary in-
tention). Seeaso Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Punishing Hatred & Prejudice,
56 STA. L. REv. 1081 (2004) (arguing that with respect to hate crimes, the majority
of wrongdoers have no intention whatsoever of sending the alleged message); Harnle,
supra note 10, at 196.
40. See, e.g, Lea Kacen, Ha"Atzmi Ha Moorchav" B'Siporai Chaiim Shel Nashim Mookot
V'Gevarim Alimeem [ The Expanded Selfin the Life Stories of Battered Women and Vio-
lent Men], 22 Soc'Y & WELFARE 129 (2000) (Isr.) (reporting a study where repeated
motifs of control, materialism, adherence, and unilateralism were sent as messages
from the men to the women, and were perceived as such by the women).
41. Whiteley, supra note 28.
42. See Hurd & Moore, supra 39 (differentiating some crimes, including hate crimes).
We argue that domestic abuse will always, or almost always, convey such a message,
PAIN, LOVE, AND VOICE 4352012]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
public response confirms the diminishment of the victim's dignity. Giv-
ing the victim a role in the pre-sentencing arguments displays support
that is embodied in the community's moral repugnance for the offense.43
Furthermore, the victim, by playing an active role, will not be forgotten
as an audience for the criminal law's condemning message. In our view,
the victim has a direct and unequivocal interest in the message that the
criminal law sends to the accused. This construct resembles Eisenstat's
statement that the advantage of vengeance (which does not exist in the
prevailing criminal law) is that it partially restores the power and dignity
of the victim.4 From the vantage point of the victim and from the per-
spective of the community that receives the message, the victim must be
allowed to state her concerns regarding the appropriate sentence, and
the criminal process is the proper forum for this.4 ' The criminal justice
system needs to let the victim be heard.
Additional reasons support giving the victim a role during the
sentencing stage. The first reason mentioned by Whiteley sees the victim
as an information provider. Whiteley makes the statement that in a
facts-based criminal justice system, the repugnance felt by the victim
and her reasons for it may provide highly significant information about
the crime to the assailant and to the community, information which
often only the victim possesses. In the context of retribution theory,
the victim is uniquely capable of conveying the impact of the wrongdo-
based on the psycho-social analysis about the place of power explained in the next
chapter.
43. Jean Hampton's expressive theory of retribution focuses on the messages that wrong-
ful behavior and sanctions send to victims, offenders, and community. See Jean
Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1677 (1992). The crime, according to Hampton, sends a "false
message" that the victim is worth less than the offender and that the latter can use
him as a means to an end. Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory ofRetribution, in RE-
TRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICs 1, 8, 12 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992).
44. Eisenstat, supra note 3, at 1138. Eisenstat does not assert the view that we should
return to a private system of vengeance but rather that the voice of the victim should
be included during the stages of the criminal trial in which sentences are decided, so
long as the supreme sentencing authority remains the state. In this way, his position
comes closer to that espoused by Whiteley, supra note 28, as it seems that the differ-
ence between "vengeance" and "resentment" is largely semantic. For a similar
approach in the completely different context of international criminal trials, see Jaime
M. Goti, What's Good and Bad About Blame and Victims, 9 LEWIS & CLARI L. REv.
629, 643 (2005).
45. According to Fisenstat, in view of the above, civil tort actions or even alternative
proceedings in which the victim may state her concerns, are insufficient. Eisenstat re-
gards these alternatives as proceedings that cause the victim to feel that she must
forgive. Eisenstat, supra note 3.
46. Whiteley, supra note 28, at 45-46.
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er's acts, hearing from the victim, therefore, will enable the court to de-
vise a sentence in accord with the degree of gravity of the wrongdoer's
acts.4 7 In the criminal process, the vantage point of the victim supple-
ments the process of evaluating the guilt of the assailant.48 This point
may be decisive in cases of domestic violence where the full picture is
highly complex and the victim may provide essential information.9 At
the same time, the victim's role is still surprisingly limited, and this ar-
gument only justifies a "soft version" of victim involvement; if we urge
giving the victim a voice in the light of the message theory, the victim
should also be allowed to express her opinion regarding the appropriate
sentence as a participating party and not only as a witness producing
evidence."'
47. Issues of how to assess the severity of the offense and how to rank offenses are fun-
damental to the adherents of the retribution theory, and one can find those who
support victim testimony if only as a means of learning about characteristic or objec-
tive damage. See, e.g., Andrew Von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm:
A Living-Standard Analysis, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1991). For support for the
view that the victim provides a more accurate standard for assessing the objective se-
verity of the damage caused and the relevance of particular circumstances, see Htirale,
supra note 10, at 176-77. For criticism of the collective point of view, see Harnle,
supra note 10, at 180-81. It should be noted that Hornle allows the damage to be
described, but not the personal preferences of the victim regarding the appropriate
sentence. According to H6rnle, the function of the victim is only to provide infor-
mation that will enable the court to make an objective, normative assessment. She
refers to "a victim's point of view" and not to "the victim's point of view." This ap-
proach is similar to that espoused by Fletcher, who deals with the public dimension
of criminal law as an assessment of the concrete loss caused to a general category of
victims and not to the specific victim. See Fletcher, supra note 16, at 57. Hornle's ap-
proach is an intermediate one and she also sees the positive psychological effect of
involvement in the process as a byproduct and not as a goal in itself. Hbrnle, supra
note 10, at 184.
48. Even in states with relatively rigid sentencing structures, the courts have to assess the
severity of the offense in order to examine the compatibility of the proposed sentence
in the circumstances, as even in this sentencing system, the circumstances of the act
are taken into account.
49. Ashworth, supra note 26.
50. "Participating parry" refers to someone with the right to express her view regarding
the sentence to the court, independently of the position taken by the prosecution or
the conviction of the court. This is generally done by means of a victim impact
statement (VIS). This is a very limited form of participation; however, we are not
dealing here with the possibility of reforming the criminal law by making the victim a
"civil party" to the criminal process. For the important distinction between the vari-
ous possible functions of the victim statement (information about the damage,
information about the victim herself and her perspective regarding the appropriate
sentence) see Moore, supra note 15, at 73. For additional background regarding vic-
tim's statements, see PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN
LAW AND LITERATURE 130 (2000).
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An additional reason offered by Whiteley is more surprising:
Whiteley essentially proposes allowing the community to influence the
victim to moderate her repugnance and reduce the level of her negative
feelings, while examining her motives and the justification for her reac-
tion." Bitter victims, precluded from having their day in court, often
turn to the media, which in turn presents each party's perspective and
expression of that perspective in the extreme. Thus, not only the wish
for vengeance, but also the victim's disappointment with the legal sys-
tem, is taken to the extreme. As a result, the community, which is
targeted by these reports, may receive a negative message about the legal
system. On the other hand, involvement in the criminal system at the
sentencing stage may lead to victims and the community feeling a great-
er sense of satisfaction with the handling of the process by the legal
system.52 Overall, giving victims a voice would contribute to the victim's
satisfaction with the legal system, as well as enhancing the public's view
of it.
Nonetheless, it seems that the most important factor is the victim's
own legitimate interest in punishment and bringing about justice. This
leads to recognition of the victim's need to send a message to the assail-
ant and to the community regarding her personal hurt." This requires
departing from the Kantian view of criminal law that disregards human
feelings and emphasizes both the rational alone and the uncompromis-
ing public element concerning criminal sentences." This Kantian
approach, which focuses on public aspects and repudiates emotion, not
only isolates the victims, but also artificially distances the wrongdoer
from the victim, to the extent that often the wrongdoer himself is una-
ware of the impact of his actions. We find even greater expression of this
in a system in which the majority of the criminal files are closed follow-
ing plea bargains. In these cases, the victim and her suffering stay away
from the eyes and the mind of the judge, the community, and the
defendant himself." Unlike the classic expressivist theory, the message
51. Whiteley, supra note 28, at 48. This is not surprising if we recall that the state con-
ducts the criminal trial because of its desire to moderate the human responses to
crime and stop the circle of vengeance.
52. For the attitude of the press to the frustration expressed by victims, see supra note 8.
53. See our proposed model for a pre-sentencing report as a device for transferring mes-
sages, infra Part IV.
54. Robert Johnson, Kant's Moral Philosophy, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOS-
oPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/kant-moral/ (last visited
Sept. 15, 2011).
55. In a system in which the majority of the criminal files are closed following plea bar-
gains, the victim is not a witness at the evidentiary stage and the defendant does not
confront her in court. Likewise, the judge in these cases does not gain an independent
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theory involves a complex multi-audience system, in which the messages
not only pass from the community to the defendant (by means of the
court), but also from the victim to the defendant; from the victim to the
community and vice versa; and from the legal system to the defendant,
the community, and the victim. This is therefore communication and
expressivism.
The expressivist theory may also be developed in such a way as to
reflect moral sentiment; punishment per se embodies a message to the
target community. Condemnation of the particular assailant is therefore
an independent goal unrelated to other utilitarian goals. According to
Whiteley, a moral agent is not guided solely by logic or common sense
but also by sentiment, and this moral sentiment includes a cognitive
element.16 The negative reaction-the desire for vengeance-is a natural
moral sentiment that arises in a man when another harms him, a reac-
tion inseparable from his emotional constitution.17 The minimal moral
demand that one man makes of another is to show good will or cau-
tion." When the other fails to meet this demand, our emotions are
awakened. The need to show reactions to the conduct of others, similar
to the complementary ability to be motivated by the attitudes of others
towards us, is embedded in the human capacity for empathy." This ap-
proach not only emphasizes cognitive abilities and the capacity to judge
or assess moral factors but also the capacity to experience emotions and
express them.
impression of the victim, the damage suffered by her, or the interaction between her
and the accused in the courtroom. The message received by the community is of a
reduced sentence by virtue of hearings held outside the public eye in the offices of the
prosecution. This message is not interpreted as support for the victim or as enforcing
justice. The above, of course, has ramifications. Accordingly, in our view, even within
the framework of the rehabilitative theory relating to the assailant, it is appropriate to
enable the victim to explain her concerns to the court. See also Whiteley, supra note
28, at 51 (noting that allowing the victim to communicate her feelings of retribution
to the offender leads to "reconciliation" and "assists in the offender's reintegration").
For the sake of completeness, we should note that when we refer to hearing the vic-
tim during the sentencing stage, we mean any stage that has ramifications for the
sentence, including giving an opinion regarding a plea bargain.
56. This is a real innovation in contrast to philosophical theories which emphasized only
the rational aspect of the moral elements, led primarily by Emanuel Kant. Whiteley,
supra note 28, at 47.
57. Whiteley, supra note 28, at 47.
58. Whiteley, supra note 28, at 47.
59. Whiteley, supra note 28, at 47. See also Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach,
Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85 (2004)
(arguing that incorporating remorse and apology into criminal proceedings is im-
portant, even if not thoroughly honest).
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Here our path separates from that of Whiteley, who did not refer to
the possibility that the victim of the offense might call for a lenient sen-
tence as opposed to a harsh one. Whiteley refers exclusively to feelings
of resentment, calling them correct and "natural" feelings awoken by the
crime.o Moreover, she cites the "battered woman syndrome" in brief
and without analysis as an example of a situation in which the woman
should feel resentment and act, but is incapable of doing so."
Our argument is completely different. As we are not automatically
committed to the view that the victim is a "tool for vengeance, we ar-
gue that consideration must also be given to the concerns of a victim
who has forgiven the assailant or who, in view of particular circum-
stances, is not interested in a harsh sentence being imposed on him. In
our opinion, there is no a priori difference between a victim who seeks a
harsh sentence and one who agrees to a more lenient one, and therefore
the possibility of hearing the concerns of the latter should not be reject-
ed. We also contend that the reasons in favor of hearing the victim
support hearing her own, distinctive voice, when this is an "authentic
voice" expressed appropriately. We shall try to show the circumstances in
which a victim of domestic violence should be heard and what weight
should be accorded to her concerns, and we contend that it may be ap-
propriate to accord more weight to a victim who forgives than to one
who demands a harsher sentence.6
We are aware that hearing a victim may also have negative ramifica-
tions, both for other victims and for the victim herself. Under the
existing system the state is responsible for sentencing the accused. This is
a structure that offers considerable advantages; it treats defendants uni-
formly and promotes due process and public confidence. The system
isolates the victim from the accused and this may ease matters for the
victim. The main fears arising from giving standing to victims revolve
around the impairment of these values, although in practice it would
seem that these values are purely theoretical. Thus, the current system
already undermines apparent uniformity, public confidence in the sys-
tem, and easing the path of the victim. The public has a sense that
victims are treated with contempt and that there are problems associated
60. Whiteley, supra note 28, at 47.
61. Whiteley, supra note 28, at 47.
62. For the criticism see Ristroph, infra note 79, which quotes comments made by Ru-
bin. Ristroph, for example, calls for a "healthy degree of democratic skepticism-a
willingness to think critically about our criminal legal system and some of its funda-
mental concepts"; this is out of recognition of the fact that all the accepted principles
of sentencing, if applied in an inappropriate manner, will lead to excessive punish-
ment. According to Ristroph, even punishment which is less harsh but more efficient
is "retributive punishment." Ristroph, infra note 79, at 1352.
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with the current form of structured sentencing. Moreover, even if the
victim fears that the entire burden of the sentence will fall on her shoul-
ders, that fear will lessen considerably if the ultimate discretion remains
in the hands of the judge as in our proposed model, a model which does
not suggest that punishment be transformed into private punishment.
The issue of "moral luck" also arises in this context.64 Should an ac-
cused be allowed to benefit from the forgiveness of the victim, or should
he be required to suffer because of the victim's "vengeful" character?
Should the sensitivities of the victim, transmitted though her comments
during sentencing, influence the court's attitude towards the sentence?1
We shall mention briefly the attribution of blame to the victim herself,6
but shall not delve into other factors such as discrimination against vic-
67tims lacking powerful legal representation.
Turning to the concerns of victims of domestic abuse who seek to
lighten the sentence of abusive partners, we shall attempt to resolve
some of the difficulties indicated here by delineating a model that takes
into account the condition of the victim and her wishes, without placing
the burden of criminal justice on her shoulders. We reiterate that be-
cause of the vagueness of concepts such as the "severity of the offense"
and "commensurate retribution," claims of lack of uniformity, inequali-
ty, and non-proportional severity of sentences also arise within the
theory of retribution. In our opinion, allowing the victim to state her
position will only help elucidate these concepts." It will also serve to
63. In the majority of countries there is some form of structured sentencing, which
guides the judge and leaves scope for the exercise of discretion that is not overly wide.
64. Moore, supra note 15, at 77.
65. Uri Yanay, Cheedoosh BMishpat Ha' P"lili: Hagashat Taskir Neegah Ahverat Meen Al
Yadai Sheroot Hameevchan L'mvoogarim [Innovations in Criminal Law: Submission of
Victims ofSex Offences report' by the Adult Probation Services], CRIMINOLOGY TRENDS:
THEORY, PRACTICES AND IMPLEMENTATION - TRIBUTE TO DR. MENACHEM HORO-
wrrz 235 (M. Hovev, L. Sebba & M. Amir eds., 2003) (Isr.).
66. Harnle suggests a possible solution to this problem in the light of German law which
only allows a certain level of blame to be attached to the victim where she exceeded
the boundaries of her legal rights or where she was required to behave in a particular
way or refrain from certain conduct and breached these requirements. Hbrnle, supra
note 10, at 207. For the continental approach, see Manuel C. Melia, Victim Behav-
iour and Offender Liability: A European Perspective, 7 BuFF. CRIM. L. R. 513 (2004).
67. The matter of representation raises complex issues that fall outside the scope of this
Article, such as whether it is right for the state to finance victims in the same way as
public defenders represent criminal defendants.
68. See, e.g., Ristroph, infra note 79, at 1295 ("[I]n legal and political practice, desert has
been proven more illimitable than limiting. Democratic conceptions of retribution
are first, elastic: desert is hard to quantify and easy to stretch."). Similar criticism may
also be made against such concepts as "dangerousness" or the "rehabilitation ideal."
Ristroph, infra note 79, at 1350.
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counter objections to victim involvement, particularly the notion that
they might prevent the implementation of abstract justice.
B. CriminalJustice Versus Alternative Proceedings
Respecting the concerns of the victim may lead to even more radi-
cal solutions, such as the use of procedures other than the criminal
justice system based on the philosophy of restorative justice." Briefly,
this theory not only refers to alternative models to the criminal justice
system but also offers a fundamentally different perspective of crime-
not as harm to the state, defined by the law using the terminology of
guilt-but as harm to a person within a system of relationships. 70 Re-
storative justice suggests that transgressive conduct be viewed as actions
that create conflict between the wrongdoer and the victim, leading to
injury to the victim of the offense, society, and even the wrongdoer him-
self, as well as creating a concomitant commitment to restore matters to
their previous state (restitutio in integrum)." The purpose of restorative
justice is to rectify the injustice through conflict resolution by identify-
ing the needs brought about by these injuries.72 This is achieved when
the parties affected by the transgressive act arrive at a resolution regard-
ing the actions which the wrongdoer and society must perform to
remedy injuries. Thus, the repair process requires the wrongdoer, the
victim, and the community to search for solutions that will promote
repair, reconciliation, and security. In this way, the theory of restorative
justice meets two of the central requirements essential to our model:
hearing the voice of the victim and transmitting a message from the vic-
tim and the community to the wrongdoer. These modes of response are
designed to repair damage when punishment is not conceived as essen-
tial. They entail non-adversarial models, grounded in the wrongdoer's
acknowledgement of his guilt and repair of the wrong for the benefit of
69. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment is Marginalized: Realistic or
Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1727, 1743 (1999).
70. Id.
71. For one of the fundamental pillars of this multi-faceted perception, see JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (Cambridge, 1989); for a critical
reading, see David Dolinko, Restorative justice and the Justification of Punishment,
UTAH L. REv. 319 (2003).
72. Braithwaite, supra note 69.
73. For the centrality of the concept of repair to the theory of restorative justice, see
Braithwaite, supra note 69, at 1743. See also Zvi D. Gabbay, Justifring Restorative Jus-
tice: A TheoreticalJustfi cation for the Use of Restorative justice Practices, 2005 J. Dise.
RESOL. 349.
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the victim (by answering her emotional, social, materialistic, and com-
pensatory needs), the community (by entrenching its values and
assuring its safety and integrity), and the wrongdoer (by reintegrating
him into the community)." Referring cases of domestic violence to al-
ternative processes to resolve disputes without escalating them may be a
solution that allows the victim's voice to be heard." Indeed, Whiteley
supports restorative justice solutions that involve personal communica-
tions between the assailant and the victim. 6 By acknowledging the
advantages of alternative procedures that reflect the victim's feelings of
resentment and anger, Whiteley adds to the traditional literature in this
area, with an emphasis on the assailant rectifying the injustice and ac-
cepting responsibility.
Nonetheless, the growing use of alternative procedures may give
rise to a charge that allowing victims to play a role during the sentencing
stage opens the door to under-punishment.n By considering the victim's
concerns as merely one of the sentencing factors and according
legitimacy only to "justified sentiments," Whiteley answers the claim
74. See, e.g., Jim Dignan, The Crime and Disorder Act and the Prospects for Restorative
Justice, 1999 CluM. L. REv. 48.
75. See, e.g., Laura Mirsky, Family Group Conferencing Worldwide: Part Two in a Series,
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR RESTORATIVE PRACTICES, available at
www.restorativepractices.org/library/fgcseries02.html (concerning the practice of "family
circles" in the context of solutions to domestic violence). With regard to restorative jus-
tice and the family institution, see, for example, John Braithwaite, Families and the
Republic, XXX1 (1) J. oF SOCIOLOGY & Soc. WELFARE, available at
www.anu.edu.aulfellows/jbraithwaitel documents/Articles/Families-Republic_2004.
pdf 2004, 199-215. For literature supporting reference to alternative proceedings,
such as mediation, in the case of disputes between spouses living in the shadow of
violence, see Kathleen 0. Corcoran & James C. Melamed, From Coercion to Empow-
erment: Spousal Abuse and Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 303 (1990). See also Joshua
D. Rosenberg, In Defense ofMediation, 33 ARIz. L. REv. 467 (1991); Diannc Neu-
mann, How Mediation Can Effectively Address the Male-Female Power Imbalance in
Divorce, 9 MEDIATION Q. 227 (1992); Ann Yellot, Mediation and Domestic Violence:
A Call for Collaboration, 8(1) 7 MEDIATION Q. 39 (1990); David Chandler, Violence,
Fear, and Communication: The Variable Impact of Domestic Violence on Mediation,
7(4) MEDIATION Q. 331 (1990).
76. Whiteley, supra note 28, at 50.
77. For criticisms of this type, also see Hurd, supra note 7. Hurd asks whether the theory
of restorative justice lacks internal boundaries regarding the level of punishment,
making it likely to lead to excessive punishment or extreme under-punishment. If the
boundary is placed in such a way that the appropriate sentence is one that removes
from the wrongdoer what he unlawfully received, the sentence will not be appropri-
ate in cases of murderers, rapists, kidnappers, and the like. Hurd further argues that it
must be shown that the sentence, such as imprisonment, benefits the victim, some-
thing that is impossible to do. At the same time, compensation is not enough, as the
sentencing theory must offer more than could be achieved by means of tort law
alone. Hurd, supra note 7, at 406-08.
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that vesting the. victim with standing during the sentencing stage will
open the door to an extreme disproportionality in sentencing, whether
in terms of the gravity or the leniency of the outcome. Reliance on
"justified sentiments" limits the range of sentences which might poten-
tially deviate from what is proportional to the "objective" gravity of the
act.
Even as we adopt Whiteley's approach, we do not conceive of it as a
restorative approach but rather as a means of including a victim's con-
cerns among other sentencing considerations, where the justification for
the sentence may be either retribution or deterrence." This is a model in
which only the wrongdoer is punished, and restrictions on excessive or
under-punishment are imposed.0 Other information will be considered.
For example, there may be a reference to previous convictions, as indica-
tive of the risk posed by the wrongdoer and as a factor favoring a
harsher sentence, even if the victim is completely unaware of that prior
record. Moreover, recognition of the complexity of the messages also
requires that the message be sent to the community, and not only to the
78. Whiteley, supra note 28. It should be noted that the theory of retribution particularly
emphasizes the lack of morality of sentences that are harsher than those due and the
use of defendants as scapegoats, even when the purpose is to achieve social goals such
as deterrence. The basic concept, therefore, is the "gravity of the offence." See
Thompson, supra note 16, at 270.
79. Mixed sentencing theories regarding both justice and the level of punishment are not
unusual. See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy and Sentencing Reform, 96 J.
CRIME & CRIMINOLOGY 1293 (2006) (noting that the retribution model will only de-
termine the sentencing range and that other sentencing goals-such as deterrence or
prevention-may be used to determine a precise sentence).
80. See Hurd, supra note 7, at 414. Ristroph, in contrast, believes that only if the sen-
tencing policy is set by the elite and not by politicians, i.e., by a body which seeks to
set limits on the severity of the sentence, will the retribution act as a restraining fac-
tor. Ristroph, supra note 79. See also Fletcher, supra note 16, at 58 (attempting to call
for the involvement of the victim in the process on the basis of the theory of retribu-
tion which integrates the manner in which arrest, trial, and punishment bring about
the eradication of the defendant's dominance over the victim and the re-
establishment of equality between them, either on the basis of corrective justice or on
the basis of distributive justice). Fletcher's statement is even more relevant when the
acts take the form of persistent domestic offenses, in which the demonstration of the
defendant's dominance and the inferior status of the victim are at the core of the rela-
tionship. For doubts regarding the ability of the theory of retribution to curb
excessive punishment urged by political forces that seek the imposition of prolonged
terms of imprisonment, see Edward Rubin, Symposium: Model Penal
Code: Sentencing: Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BuFF. CRIM. L. R. 17 (2003). Accord-
ing to Rubin, the contemporary American system contains an equation whereby
retribution means harsher punishments, which in turn means prolonged terms of im-
prisonment. Id. at 18. If this argument is accepted, it is difficult to contend that
giving the victim a voice during the sentencing stage would make existing punish-
ments harsher.
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victim and the perpetrator. This goal would probably not be adequately
achieved within an alternative procedure, and is often less visible than
the criminal process.
It follows that in suitable cases, more creative solutions may be re-
quired, such as a combination of alternative proceedings and classic
criminal sentencing procedures.82 Thus, for example, if a very violent
spouse is sent for treatment without a conviction, the deterrence will
almost certainly lose its impact as will the element of retribution,
whereas the message sent to all of the relevant audiences will be one of
contempt. In contrast, if treatment is included as a form of "healing" or
"repairing" which supplements the punishment, more than one goal
may conceivably be achieved. This would not occur in cases of purely
alternative proceedings. However, it would be possible where the alter-
native methods supplement the criminal process and to some extent
change the form of punishment or its scope albeit not the substance of
the process.
In any event, because we are not concerned here with circumvent-
ing the criminal process but with addressing our question from within
the existing criminal justice system, we shall not elaborate further on the
general criticism of this system. Instead, in the remainder of this Arti-
cle we shall examine how our theoretical framework will affect the
81. See, e.g. Kerry Loomis, Comment, Domestic Violence and Mediation: A Tragic Com-
bination for Victims in California Family Court, 35 CAL. W. L. REv. 355, 366 (1999).
82. See Daniel W. Van Ness, New Wine and Old Wineskins: Four Challenges of Restorative
Justice, 4 CmM. L.F. 251, 259 (1993) (presenting a view of restorative justice as a
supplement to the traditional criminal justice system).
83. Even though we shall not elaborate further on the criticisms directed at alternative
proceedings, we should emphasize the relevance of these criticisms to offenses involv-
ing violence and relationships between unequal parties. See Eisenstat, supra note 3, at
1115. See also Penelope Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of
Power, 40(2) BuFF. L. REv. 441 (1992) (arguing that within the context of alterna-
tive proceedings in domestic disputes there is a tinge of violence); Trina Grillo, The
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991). An-
other relevant criticism is that alternative proceedings undermine the sense of justice,
by creating a lack of uniformity (a criticism with which we do not agree, as we believe
that justice reflects broad values apart from uniformity between defendants), as they
lead to extremity in personal statements during the sentencing stage, and in cases of
serious offenses they undermine the principle of proportionality. In the language of
the expressivist theory, it may be said that an alternative process sends an unclear and
ambiguous message. DeFord, supra note 20, at 849. As we believe that the public as-
pect also has an important role to play in cases of domestic violence, this cannot be
the only solution. Whiteley herself suggests a combination of traditional sentencing
and alternative solutions, such as mediation between victim and the assailant, in the
case of serious violent offenses. Whiteley, supra note 28, text accompanying n.44ff.
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participation of victims who ask for more lenient sentences without
abandoning the system founded on the public model.
II. WOMEN LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF VIOLENCE:
SHOULD THE CONCERNS OF VICTIMS SEEKING MORE LENIENT
SENTENCES FOR WRONGDOERS BE CONSIDERED-
A TEST CASE OF THE DILEMMA
The question of whether to take into account an abused woman's
request for her violent abuser's sentence to be lightened raises three sepa-
rate difficulties.
The first ensues from the nature of the sentencing stage, which fo-
cuses on both the transgressional act and the wrongdoer. This is a stage
that requires all the classic sentencing considerations to be balanced.
The problems are not confined to domestic violence offenses. In the
prevailing system, the court is vested with broad sentencing discretion.
In domestic violence offenses, the problem is more acute because of the
unique disposition of violent men within the category of wrongdoers,
characterized by a complex emotional world and inflexible modes of
thought that are explained extensively in the therapy literature." These
characteristics typically create tension between classic sentencing consid-
erations in these types of cases.
The second difficulty relates to the introduction of the perspective
of the victim as an independent factor among a series of sentencing con-
siderations. Here we are no longer observing the wrongdoer, but rather
the private interest of the victim and the manner in which the sentenc-
ing policy will serve her, recognize her needs, and take her choices into
account. In the past it was almost impossible to find judicial references
to the private interest of the victim as a consideration separate from the
general public interest during the sentencing stage, beyond general as-
84. See, e.g., Amy Holtzworth-Munroe et al., A Brief Review of the Research on Husband
Violence: Part I: Maritally Violent Versus Nonviolent Men, 2 AGG RESSION & VIOLENT
BEHAVIOR 65 (1997) [hereinafter Holtzworth-Munroe et al., Review ofHusband Vio-
lence: Part 1]; Amy Holtzworth-Munroe, A Typology ofMen Who Are Violent Toward
Their Female Partners: Making Sense ofthe Heterogeneity in Husband Violence, 9 CUR-
RENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SC., 140 (2000) (outlining subgroups of violent men:
family-only, dysphoric-borderline, and generally violent-antisocial).
85. A typical example of a dispute that arises in relation to these offenses refers to the
tension between the deterrence-retribution approach and the treatment-rehabilitation
approach which casts doubt about the effectiveness of punishment for violent men
that is unaccompanied by a treatment process. The dispute raises questions regarding
the suitability of classic sentencing for this class of offenders.
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sumptions regarding the nature of the harm caused by a particular form
of abuse, such as sexual abuse. The interests of the victim were engulfed
by what the court termed "the gravity of the offense," and rarely was
evidence used regarding specific damage. The trend towards changing
the role of victims was accompanied by a developing recognition of their
status as an independent factor to be taken into account during sentenc-
ing.17 With the broadening knowledge of the harm caused to victims of
various offenses came a developing recognition of categories of crime
victims, as well as calls for consideration to be given to the special char-
acteristics of particular offenses and for the ultimate sentence to reflect
the unique harm caused to the victims."
The third difficulty relates to the psycho-social dynamics of a vio-
lent relationship. The world of women living in the shadow of violence
is rife with complexities which often lead the particular victim to deviate
from the model of the classic "victim" and call for a lenient sentence.
A discussion of each of the three difficulties gives rise to thorny
problems. In this chapter we shall focus on the third point described
above. At the outset it should be noted that this complex matter has not
been clearly settled. Accordingly, our primary purpose is to offer direc-
tions of thought for possible, even if limited, solutions. We open the
discussion by considering the unique nature of domestic violence of-
fenses and the psycho-social background characterizing them.
Subsequently, we will describe theories taken from feminist legal litera-
ture that propose a variety of approaches to analyzing the conduct of
battered women. Based on this we shall apply the conclusions emerging
from the sociological and legal discussion to the issue at hand and offer
a possible solution.
A. On the Unique Nature ofDomestic Violence Offenses
"I love him and hate him, so confused
It is difficult for me with him and difficult without him,
86. Erez, supra note 24, at 546.
87. Erez, supra note 24, at 546.
88. Erez, supra note 24, at 546. See also Michael P. Vidmar, A Crime Victim's Right to Be
"Reasonably Heard"- Kenna v. United States District Court, 37(3) GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REv. 695 (2007) (discussing Kenna v. United States, 435 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th
Cit. 2006) and the federal right for victims to be "reasonably heard" in court during
sentencing).
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It is all like a dream,
But this has my life already for 15 years...
In domestic violence offenses, the female victim meets the threat to
her safety, which is simultaneously the source of love and trust, in her
home. Someone who has not experienced this paradox finds it difficult
to understand and conceptualize in legal terms. Unlike typical offenses
in which two individuals who are unconnected in any union confront
each other, and where the hostility generally focuses on an isolated act,
in domestic violence cases the victim and her assailant are bound by
complex, emotional human ties, replete with internal contradictions.
Generally, the event is not a solitary act but rather a series of abusive acts
scattered over a continuing relationship; the concrete violent act, which
is the subject of the specific charge, is but one link in a chain of vio-
lence.
Traditionally, criminal law does not examine the dynamics of
spousal relations, which by their nature are multidimensional and in-
clude powerful positive emotions such as love, longing, warmth, safety,
and trust. Martha Mahoney explains that the criminal law concentrates
on the defined criminal act which occurs at a clear point in time and
space, and thus dissociates the understanding of the event from its
unique complexity, the ambivalence within the spousal relationship, and
the special psychological and emotional situations that attend an inti-
mate continuous relationship.0 The typical process of testifying in a
criminal trial enables the voice of the woman to be heard; following evi-
dentiary rules, she constructs her story in a question-and-answer format.
However, this process also interrupts the continuity of the experience
and impairs her ability to absorb the full events as a body of occurrences
within the reality of daily life subject to the dynamics of a violent rela-
tionship."
Feminist writers point to the difficulty of mediating between the
dichotomous criminal law, which is based on an adversarial perspective,
and images of "assailants" and "victims" that deviate from their typical
images. For example, the criminal justice system finds it difficult to em-
brace complex messages such as "suffers but loves," "hurts but does not
89. Letter by L., a married woman, who has lived under the shadow of violence through-
out her marriage (on file with the authors).
90. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separa-
tion, 90 MiCH. L. REv. 1, 16 (1991).
91. Leora Bilsky, Nashim Mookot: MeHagana Atzmit Le'Hagana Atzmit [Battered Women:
From 'Self-defense'to 'Defense ofthe Sef], 6 PLILIM 5, 36, n. 97 (1998) (Isr.).
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ing that they are described as "natural" experiences among women living
under the shadow of violence. These messages, which are foreign to the
conventional perspective of criminal law, provide a basis for understand-
ing the emotional and psychological world of women who are victims of
violence. Accordingly, the inability of criminal law to identify complex
emotional situations and grant them a worthy place and interpretation
leads to negative ramifications, particularly in gender-related areas.
93 The
difficulty in mediating between the two worlds creates confusion and
establishes an obstacle at a time when the criminal law encounters a
situation such as that which is at the focus of our discussion. Yet, in
the area of sentencing, the criminal law applies a less dichotomous
92. As Baker explained, "[a] battered woman often does not experience just one feeling of
helplessness; she is likely to experience an extensive range of emotions, including an-
ger, love, hope, attachment, frustration, fear and pain." Katharine K. Baker, Gender
and Emotion in Criminal Law, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 447, 460 (2005).
93. Baker expresses this difficulty well: "What the law is fairly inept at appreciating is the
more complicated, multifaceted emotional situations in which people often find
themselves, situations in which they feel competing and diverse emotions-fear and
desire, love and hate-at the same time . .. [T]he failure to appreciate or accommo-
date complex emotion and willingness to recognize simplistic emotion has gendered
effects." Id. at 447 n. 1. See also David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered
Women Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 ARiz. L. REv. 67, 112 (1997) (discussing
the American feminist struggle to obtain recognition of the defense of "battered
women syndrome" as qualifying the criminal liability of battered women who kill
their abusers. Faigman and Wright explain that placing the emphasis on the hope-
lessness of battered women, as follows from the theory of the syndrome, leaves no
room for active defensive measures on their part and deters those women who kill
their abusive partners in self-defense from asserting the syndrome defense); Mahoney,
supra note 90, at 38-43; Baker, supra note 92, at 460 & n. 79. Baker attributes these
results to the inability of the criminal law to identify emotional complexity; so long as
the activities of women are not categorized in one of the "simplistic" emotional clas-
ses-leaving or completely surrendering-the criminal law is left unable to supply an
appropriate legal response to the life experiences of women suffering from violence.
This outcome emphasizes the negative gender bias accompanying the criminal law's
difficulty in identifying complex emotional situations. This phenomenon occurs
more often in view of doctrines negating or reducing the criminal liability of men for
the commission of violent acts as a result of a "simple" emotional response (an imme-
diate response, devoid of an internal-emotional struggle, which is committed
instantaneously without premeditation). "Simple" emotional responses are easily
identified in the adversarial criminal discourse and are set out naturally, thereby caus-
ing the persons concerned, who statistically are most often men, to be treated with
consideration and leniency. Baker points to self-defense and the heat of passion ex-
cuse as examples of the doctrine which patently provides a gender-biased defense. See
Baker, supra note 92. For the argument that "cultural defense," such as defense in
cases of "family honor killings," also discriminates between men and women and
leads to the acquittal of men, see Doriane Coleman, Individualizing Justice through
Muliculturalism: The Liberals'Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1094 (1996).
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approach. The discussion regarding the degree of punishment is com-
plex and generally attempts to balance a variety of sentencing factors.
We shall attempt to present the essential guidelines for an under-
standing of the emotional world of women who have been harmed by
spousal abuse and the dynamics characterizing violent relationships as
the background for the legal analysis that will follow below."
B. A Psycho-Social Perspective of the Dynamics of a Violent Relationship
Clinical studies in sociological literature regarding the structure of
the family describe the cyclical dynamics that characterize a violent rela-
tionship as well as the relationship of control between the partners that
strengthens as time passes. These studies explain how violence is sus-
tained and why each of the spouses preserves his or her functions within
this destructive trap. In the clinical literature, violence against a spouse is
defined as all acts in a chain of behavior that create a continuing pattern
of control in the victim's experience." Judith Lewis-Herman, a psy-
chologist who researches trauma, explains that systems of control over
another person are based on repeated modes of conduct that cause psy-
chological trauma." These systems are intended to deprive the person
94. In view of the limited space available here, we shall not expand on the emotional
world of violent men and on the psychological processes that take place in this emo-
tional world, even though familiarity with this issue is relevant to a full picture of the
dynamic of a violent relationship. For a more comprehensive discussion, see
Holtzworth-Munroe et al., Review ofHusband Violence: Part I, supra note 84; Louise
Dixon & Kevin Browne, The Heterogeneity of Spouse Abuse: A Review, 8 AGGRESSION
& VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 107-130 (2003); DONALD G. DUTrON, THE DOMESTIC As-
SAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 63-96,
121-60 (1995).
95. Sharon Portwood, When Paradigms Collide: Exploring the Psychology of Family Vio-
lence and Implications for Legal Proceedings, 24 PACE L. REv. 221, 224 (2003); Lisae
C. Jordan, Introduction: Special Issues on Domestic Violence, 39 FAM. L.Q. 1, 4
(2005 2006); Kersti A. Yllo, Through a Feminist Lens, Gender, Power and Violence, in
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 48-58 (R.J. Gelles & D.R. Loseke
eds., 1993). This definition per se sharpens the narrow boundaries of the legal defini-
tions determining the criminality of acts of violence (the criminal law only recognizes
physical acts of violence, sexual injury, and threats of criminal acts), in contrast to the
social-clinical definition that recognizes a broad spectrum of acts which entail "vio-
lence" (such as psychological violence, mental abuse, financial violence, destruction of
objects, and the like). The common denominator of the series of acts equivalent to
"violence" on the clinical plane is the destructive psychological impact on the inner
world of the victim, whereas sometimes acts that do not fall within the ambit of the
criminal law-such as emotional abuse-can cause enormous mental damage.
96. JUDITH LEWIS-HERMAN, TRAuMA AND RECOVERY 100 (1995).
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being controlled of her power and isolate her from the environment."
Indeed, the central experience which women describe in violent rela-
tionships is the control exercised over every aspect of their lives: the
feeling that the man is dictating how to behave, what to think, what to
say, and what to do." This feeling causes women to lose their "self" and
perceive themselves as an inseparable part of the personality of the man.
This phenomenon is known in the psychological literature as "adher-
ence," a situation in which violent men "swallow" women by negating
their independent identity and trampling their personal autonomy."
Men experience themselves as the subject and women as the object, and
as the relationship develops, women begin to feel the same.
Battered women commonly state that their sensitive psychological
state caused them to misjudge their partners in the beginning of the
relationship.so Statements that could be interpreted as expressions of
control and jealousy are interpreted as expressions of love and courtship.
The need for support at the early stages of the relationship leads to great
willingness to compromise, show restraint, and give a positive and op-
timistic interpretation to abusive behavior.'o' This is the beginning of
the trap.
In response to the first violent incident, women engage in the psy-
chological defense mechanisms'0 2  of "minimalization" and
"rationalization," i.e., they attempt to trivialize and justify the event."o
These mechanisms cause women to overlook the event or take it in
stride. After the first incident, women enter into a state of readiness in
an attempt to prevent the next outburst. As they feel that they have con-
tributed to causing the outburst, they take responsibility for eradicating
the violence.1O4 Here the paradox of the trap becomes evident: as
women's attempts to prevent the next outburst prove unsuccessful, they
try even harder to prevent them on successive occasions, again without
97. Id.
98. For the testimony of abused women regarding their experiences in the shadow of
violence, see Kacen, supra note 40, at 140-49; Yllo, supra note 95, at 56.
99. See Kacen, supra note 40, at 146.
100. LEWIS-HERMAN, supra note 96, at 103-04.
101. LEWIS-HERMAN, supra note 96, at 104, 106.
102. According to Freud's psychoanalytic theory, defensive mechanisms are used by a
person to distance him from the feeling of fear and to protect the "self." The defense
mechanisms operate on the unconscious plane and distort or twist reality to some ex-
tent. These activities consume mental energy. Just as fear is vital to every healthy
organism by providing a warning signal of danger so too are defensive mechanisms
against fear vital to all organisms. "Rationalization" and "minimalization" are types of
defensive mechanisms.
103. LEWIS-HERMAN, supra note 96, at 104.
104. Kacen, supra note 40, at 132.
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success. The more they defend the violence in their mind and assume
responsibility for "weaning" the man from his behavior, the more often
they repeat their efforts and refuse to give up. They regard giving up as a
personal failure. Likewise, violent men expect women to succeed in
weaning them from their destructive violent behavior. When women fail
to do so, men blame them for their conduct, and women, in response,
internalize the blame and try again.' 5 The greater the number of failed
attempts the more powerful the sense of blame, which becomes a central
motif in the life of women. This blame causes women to try harder and
the cycle repeats. The clinical literature emphasizes that women's ac-
ceptance of responsibility for the violence of men increases the
likelihood of women turning into victims. The failed efforts to stop the
violence cause a psychological process known as "loss of the observing-
self."' 06 Life in the shadow of violence completely undermines the exis-
tential experience and sense of well-being of women.'0o Social isolation,
which in many cases characterizes families suffering from violence,
makes the man the central figure in their lives.'O' Many women living in
the shadow of violence are left without supportive social or family con-
nections, and the social isolation only strengthens their need to grasp
the one powerful connection left to them.'o
Clinical studies show that emotional intensity in violent relation-
ships is much stronger than in normative relationships, and they are
characterized by significant emotional ambivalence,' which creates
emotional confusion and instability in the relationship."' Psychologist
105. Kacen, supra note 40, at 143.
106. Kacen, supra note 40, at 133, 150-52.
107. Clinical studies show high rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among
women suffering from violence. In contrast to victims of serious but one-time trau-
mas, battered women develop repeated and persistent trauma that pervades and
grinds down their personality. If victims of serious one-time traumatic events often
feel "that they are not themselves," victims of chronic trauma feel that they do not
have a self at all. See LEWIS-HERMAN, supra note 96, at 110. See also RAQUEL K. BER-
GEN, WIFE RAPE: UNDERSTANDING THE RESPONSE OF SURVIVORS AND SERVICE
PROVIDERS (1996). Studies further show a high compatibility between the appearance
of various psychological, mental, and functional symptoms, such as depression, high
levels of anxiety, low self-image, faulty life skills, and spousal abuse. See Amy
Holtzworth-Munroe et al., A Brief Review of the Research on Husband Violence: Part
I: The Psychological Effects of Husband Violence on Battered Women and Their Chil-
dren, 2 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 179 (1997) [hereinafter Holtzworth-
Munroe et al., Review ofHusband Violence: Part Il].
108. Cf LEWIS-HERMAN, supra note 96, at 104-05 (articulating a theory regarding the
dependence created between a captor and prisoner).
109. Kacen, supra note 40, at 133, 148.
110. Kacen, supra note 40, at 132-33.
111. Kacen, supra note 40, at 132-33.
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Lenore E.A. Walker's famous model depicts the dynamics of a violent










In brief, the anger-building stage describes the creation of tension
in the relationship."' The men's anger, which may originate from many
factors, including factors unconnected to their relationship with the
women, becomes more powerful. The more men feel that women do
not meet their expectations, the greater the anger."' Women try to sof-
ten and calm abusive men in an attempt to prevent the next outburst,
but the more the tension builds, the more they feel that they are incapa-
ble of quelling it."' Eventually when women are exhausted, they
broadcast despair and loss of motivation to please the abusers. The latter
feel that the women are giving up on them and they begin to experience
a fear of abandonment. Their level of frustration rises and the tension
increases."' Eventually, an event occurs which triggers a new violent
outburst, and the tension that has gathered is released." 7 The outburst
causes the couple to feel panic and this is followed by quiet,
112. See LENORE E.A. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME 91-105 (3d ed.
2009). These stages are purely schematic, and as such they only provide a general





117. Mahoney emphasizes that this is not "coincidental" violence, as is implied by the
Walker model. The actions of the abuser are superficial and may be explained ration-
ally as part of a power struggle between the couple that has the purpose of increasing
the man's control over the woman and obtaining real advantages as a result. Ma-
honey, supra note 90, at 53-60.
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accompanied by remorse. Abusive men feel cruel and fear that their
women will leave them. In order to make them stay, men attempt to
compensate women victims. They make promises, try to pacify the
women, and swear that they will never commit these acts again. During
the "honeymoon period" there is no violence; there is hope for the fu-
ture. Women wish to believe that they will not suffer anymore. The
men's behavior gives them hope that something has genuinely changed.
During the "honeymoon period" a new process of growing anger com-
mences, however, and the circle of violence repeats. According to
Walker, during the "honeymoon" stage, the victimization of women is
completed;' this period creates a circle of violence as it leaves women
believing and hoping in the relationship.
As the years pass, women develop "learned hopelessness":"' their
failures to control the outbursts of men teach them that they cannot
change the situation and that it is pointless to try; all they can do is try
to survive in the existing circumstances. Hopelessness becomes the cen-
tral experience in the life of abused women and it is translated into a
single-minded pursuit of survival.
Walker explains that the longer the couple lives under the shadow
of violence, the longer the periods in which tension mounts and out-
bursts occur, and the shorter the stage of remorse.120 The men's
motivation to create the "honeymoon" stage lessens because their fear of
being abandoned decreases. The dynamic of a violent relationship cre-
ates a traumatic proximity.12' The obsessive dynamic of the relationship
118. Walker, supra note 112, 91-98.
119. This concept originates in the field of psychobiology and was coined by the research-
er Martin Seligman, who carried out the famous experiment on dogs. As part of the
experiment, two groups of dogs were put into two separate cages and given electric
shocks. In one cage the shocks were given at a fixed frequency and intensity; in the
second cage the shocks were given at a random and unexpected frequency and inten-
sity. The findings of the experiment were astonishing: in the cage where the shocks
were set and expected, the dogs learned to avoid them. In the second cage, the dogs
developed depression, loss of vitality, and at a certain stage, when Seligman opened
the door of the cage-the dogs refused to escape. They had learned to be "hopeless."
The experiment taught the dogs that taking precautions would not necessarily pre-
vent the next shock and therefore their behavior was of no significance; their efforts
were useless. MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOP-
MENT AND DEATH 23-25 (2nd ed. 1991).
120. Walker, supra note 112, 91-98.
121. This concept, which is taken from captor-captive relations ("Stockholm syndrome")
describes the mutual psychological dependence and strong bond that unite the vio-
lent man and the battered woman regarding the trauma experienced in the
relationship. The "Stockholm syndrome" is the term given to the phenomenon in
which a person held against his will by strangers identifies psychologically with the
narrative and acts of his captors. This phenomenon is an expression of a psychological
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against a backdrop of social isolation creates the sense for partners that
they alone can provide warmth, safety, and comfort.
William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, and Austin Sarat use a
three-stage model to describe the difficulties a person who has been
harmed faces when seeking to enforce his rights in court. 22 The three
stages are (1) awareness of the harm and the ability to name it (naming);
(2) the victim's ability to attribute responsibility for the harm to the per-
son who abused him or her (blaming); (3) the victim's petition to the
court for a remedy for his or her injury (claiming).123 This model ex-
plains the existence of the phenomenon of under-reporting in domestic
violence cases. Women living under the shadow of violence find it diffi-
cult to jump over each of the three hurdles, and their close relationships
with their abusers exacerbates their difficulties. During the naming stage
they sometimes find it difficult to understand that there is something
wrong with the abusive behavior of their partner, in light of the tenden-
cy of battered women to believe that such behavior is normal in spousal
relationships and that violence is a natural tool for determining the bal-
ance of power in the family. Even after women have identified the
violence as a cause of their suffering, during the blaming stage they tend
to attribute responsibility for the situation to themselves and internalize
the blame. The claiming stage is characterized by difficulty in telling
their stories for various reasons, including shame, fear, fear of harm to
their children, social isolation which makes it difficult to ask for help, a
sense of powerlessness, suspicion, lack of belief in the authorities, and
emotional ambivalence.
C Women Living Under the Shadow of Violence from a Feminist
One-Dimensional Perspective-Between Choice and Trap
The psycho-social background discussed above is a necessary basis
for understanding two approaches which have been developed in the
defense mechanism developed by the prisoner as part of his attempt to survive in the
difficult circumstances forced upon him. Lewis-Herman explains that like relation-
ships which develop in captivity between the captor and the prisoner and which are
based on mutual dependence, a paradoxical dynamic develops between the violent
man and the battered woman: the relationship of adherence is propelled by constant
conflict between dependence (weakness) and power (control)-prima facie, the wom-
an (the prisoner) is "weak" and the man (the captor) "controls" her, but in practice
the two are dependent upon each. LEWIS-HERMAN, supra note 96, at 116-17.
122. William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Trans-
formation ofDisputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 LAw & Soc'y REv. 631 (1980).
123. Id. at 634-36.
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feminist literature dealing with domestic violence against women. Each
of these approaches offers a different perspective of the conduct of
abused women. The central question that these theories seek to explain
is why many women, including those who suffer from prolonged, seri-
ous and extreme violence, remain in the violent relationship and do not
leave the abusive partner. This analysis may also be used as a tool to
explain the conduct of battered women in the context of their subse-
quent requests for leniency for their abusers.
One approach seeks to explain the conduct of women who remain
in a violent relationship through the narrative of a lack of options that
keeps them in the violent relationship.'24 We shall term this approach
the "trap" theory. This theory asserts that the reality of these women's
lives does not leave them any practical alternatives. It places them in a
dead-end situation because of the fear that the threatening spouse will
leave, the ambivalence characterizing the "traumatic proximity" of the
couple and the external obstacles mentioned above. It denudes women
of their ability to start a new life and precludes realistic and genuine op-
tions of conduct. Furthermore, today it is known that women who
consider separation face a particularly high risk to their lives.'25 Many
murders of women by their partners are committed because the man
fears that the woman will leave. The issue of separation in a violent rela-
tionship therefore poses a real physical risk to women.
In the legal literature, the trap theory reflects the radical feminist
school of thought, which observes the victimization of women through
the prism of the power balance between men and women in society, a
relationship that perpetuates the inferiority and dependence of women
and seeks to emphasize the social context of personal violence ("the per-
sonal is political"). 2 6 The radical feminist stance asserts that the frequent
use of the private/public dichotomy (when the criminal law has no
foothold in the "private" sphere) is intended to enforce biased views and
not to regulate various masculine activities, including domestic vio-
lence.' 2' This analysis exposes the range of social, economic, and legal
factors obstructing battered women's path to effective protection. It also
condemns attempts to privatize the phenomenon of domestic violence
against women, which leads to an emphasis on the functions of profes-
124. Bilsky, supra note 91, at 23.
125. Baker, supra note 92, at 459; Mahoney, supra note 90, at 83-92.
126. For extensive development of this perspective, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, To-
WARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
127. See generally CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW (1989); CAROL
SMART, THE TIES THAT BIND: LAW, MARRIAGE, AND THE REPRODUCTION OF PATRI-
ARCHAL RELATIONS xii, 27 (1984).
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sionals, whose dialogue sometimes normalizes the violence and portrays
female victims as both responsible and pathological.' 28 In lieu of this, the
feminist analysis seeks to clarify that this is not the sporadic problem of
"abnormal" or "strange" women who extraordinarily choose not to re-
port the abuse and not to leave.129 Rather, the social reality makes these
women victims of the system and contributes to the fact that responsi-
bility is imposed on the bodies which are supposed to supply women
with genuine protection. This radical school of thought therefore calls
for the politicization of social wrongs that historically were perceived as
private and demands increased state involvement in private lives. This
approach seeks to place responsibility upon the state, society, and the
community.
The second approach reflects a point-of-view based on the ideas of
cultural feminism taken from psychologist Carol Gilligan and on con-
clusions drawn in studies on gender socialization."o We shall refer to
this approach as the choice theory. The choice theory asserts that abused
women choose to remain in the violent relationship not because they
lack options, but because they actually choose to maintain their relation-
ship, as explained by the central position given by women to the "self-
in-relations."'' Katharine Baker states:
Women remain in relationships not only because they may be
financially dependent on their partners or because they face a
greater risk of violence if they leave; these women are often
emotionally bound to their partners. Many battered woman
do not want to go. They want the violence to stop, and they
want to feel safe, but they do not want to leave. Rather, they
want to stay in a relationship with men whom they often con-
tinue to love, and with whom they share a life, a family, and a
community. The legal presumption that one should walk away
from a relationship because one gets hit reflects a remarkably
128. Erella Shadmi, Likrat Tfisa Acheret Shel Alimoot Gvarim Neged Nashim: Achriyoot
HaChevra V'HaMedina [Towards a Diferent Perception of Men's Violence Against
Women: Responsibility of Society and the State], 64 Soc. SECUlRw (2003) (Isr.).
129. For a criticism of the focus placed on the question, "why didn't the woman leave?"
see Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the
Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1283 (1992).
130. Bilsky, supra note 91, at 27.
131. Baker, supra note 92, at 457-58; see also Katharine K. Baker, Dialectics and Domestic
Abuse, 110 YALE L. J. 1459, 1477 (2001).
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anemic understanding of the emotional complexity of rela-
tionships.12
The choice theory relies on the existence of gender differences between
men and women in modes of thought and moral-ethical perceptions.
Theoretical and empirical studies in psychology and sociology, such as
those conducted by Gilligan, Chodorow, Miller, and Dinnerstein, show
that whereas male thinking appears to be detached from the environ-
ment, places personal autonomy as the top priority, and evaluates
situations analytically and binarily as part of the "ethic of justice," fe-
male thinking is compromising, less dichotomous, and admires the
"ethic of concern.""' The psychoanalyst Chodorow argues that one of
the primary expressions of this difference is the manner in which the
role of the individual is perceived in this relationship."' Thus, for exam-
ple, women perceive themselves as focusing on the other; they tend to
attribute existential importance to the central relationship in their lives
132. Baker, supra note 92, at 457-58.
133. See generally NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978);
DOROTHY DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR (1978); CAROL GILLI-
GAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982); J. MILLER, TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN (1976).
The research of psychologist Carol Gilligan is the most recent of the studies listed.
Her research is based on the developmental theory of the psychoanalyst Chodorow,
whereby the female experience is largely based on relationships, actuality, and caring,
whereas the male experience is based on boundaries, principles, and excessive distanc-
ing. Gilligan analyzes the different manner in which boys and girls observe complex
situations that give rise to moral quandaries and expose the "other voice" of women.
Gilligan concludes that men and women's moral judgment is based on different
worldviews regarding the relationship between the self and the environment. See also
Currie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Difference Voice: Speculations on a Women's
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 42 (1985). The cultural theory is
primarily implemented in contexts focusing on unique life experiences of women
(motherhood, birth, pregnancy, relationships) in which their power to choose and re-
sponsibility are emphasized as sources of positive power. Nonetheless, feminist writers
also apply cultural analysis in the context of domestic violence; analyzing the conduct
of battered women through the prism of female modes of thinking and ethics that at-
tribute enormous value to the continuity of the relationship and its place in women's
lives. This analysis seeks to replace the image of the "victim" with that of the "survi-
vor," thereby emphasizing women's courage and power notwithstanding their
passivity and weakness. For general studies that point to the differences in cognitive
thinking and emotional perception between the genders, see Robin West, Jurispru-
dence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 20-21 (1988). See generally DIANE HALPERN,
SEx DIFFERENCES IN COGNITIVE ABILITIES (3d ed. 2000); DOREEN KIMURA, SEX AND
COGNITION (1999); LINDA MEALEY, SEx DIFFERENCES, DEVELOPMENT, AND EvOLU-
TIONARY STRATEGIES (2000).
134. CHODOROW, supra note 133.
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and see it as a factor shaping their identity." In contrast, men are edu-
cated from birth to perceive themselves as separate, autonomous, and
independent. Men tend to define their self-identity as dependent on the
maintenance of boundaries and distance between the self and the oth-
er.'3 6 This difference may explain why women choose romantic
relationships, even when they involve violence: they see these relation-
ships with the significant other in their lives as supremely valuable, part
of their self-identity, and the essence of their existence.'31 Concern for
the integrity of the family and the welfare of the children may also in-
fluence their conduct.138
Feminist writers show that the majority of solutions offered by var-
ious interventional authorities, including the legal system, law
enforcement agencies, and welfare bodies, are shaped by male perspec-
tives and take the view that if women are suffering because of their
partners, the best way forward is to for the women to separate from
them.'3 9 The various solutions are sequential and uniform and are there-
fore shaped in the spirit of this premise, i.e., removing men from the
home, women escaping to a battered women's asylum, imposing a harsh
sentence of imprisonment, or similar solutions that seek to separate the
couple. In some of the treatment frameworks that offer help to battered
women the success of the treatment is measured by the percentage of
women who leave their partners.o The criminal justice system also
works on the premise that women's decision to leave abusive partners
ought to be easy.'4 ' The entire system is recruited to favor separation-a
binary solution that reflects a point of view perceived as characterizing
the male ethic of thinking. The statement that battered women choose
135. CHODOROW, supra note 133.
136. CHODOROW, supra note 133.
137. See Baker, supra note 131, at 1477. For a discussion of long-term psychoanalytical
studies that show to what extent relationships are essential to mental health, see STE-
PHEN A. MITCHELL, RELATIONAL CONCEPTS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 30 (1988).
138. Mahoney, supra note 90, at 17. The vital role played by the familial unit in the lives
of battered women is reflected in the words of one of the women interviewed in Ma-
honey's study: "My husband is an alcoholic. Things have been really bad these past
few years. But we've been married thirteen years. And I have three children. For nine
of those years, he was the best husband and father anyone could have asked for ... I
may have to leave. But if I do, I'm giving up on a father for the children, and I'm giv-
ing up on him. And I can't just throw away those nine years . .. I may have to decide
to go. But I'm not going to do it lightly." Mahoney, supra note 90, at 21.
139. Einat Peled et al., Choice and Empowerment for Battered Women Who Stay: Towards a
Constructivist Model, 45 Soc. WomK 9 (2000).
140. Id.
141. Baker, supra note 92, at 459.
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to stay in the relationship out of their own free will and that this choice
reflects what is good for them is difficult for us to accept.
Indeed, women who face violence in their daily lives feel that the
solutions offered to them by the establishment ignore their needs. Stud-
ies show that until battered women leave the home permanently, they
return to it an average of five times.14 Beyond the material difficulties
leaving entails, many women understand that leaving involves giving up
a strong emotional tie that they need.'43 Moreover, the persistent and
cyclical nature of the cycle of violence makes it difficult for women to
free themselves from the relationship in view of the "honeymoon peri-
ods" interwoven between the outbursts of violence. Adoption of a norm
that encourages leaving-as the solitary response on the part of women
to episodes of violence in a continuing relationship-reflects the eleva-
tion of autonomy and individualism to the status of "sacred" values. 44
Feminist writers seek to expose the patriarchal nature of these solutions
and assert that they adopt "another cultural language."1 45
On the practical level, a negative correlation therefore exists be-
tween battered women's typical patterns of response and norms of
autonomy that the law and other systems seek to encourage through
their recognition of leaving as the "proper" response."' Considerable
doubts also arise on the normative level: is it appropriate to encourage a
uniform response as the "legitimate" or "proper" response to the wide
spectrum of violent episodes erupting in relationships? Portwood distin-
guishes between a continuing relationship, which is accompanied by
severe violence ("patriarchal terrorism"), and relationships in which the
142. Holtzworth-Munroe, et al., supra note 107, at 194 (citing L.E. OKUN, WOMAN
ABUSE: FACTS REPLACING MYTHS (1986)).
143. Baker, supra note 92.
144. Baker, supra note 92, at 465.
145. See Peled, supra note 139, at 16-17, 19 (proposing the adoption of a tolerant inter-
ventionist model that recognizes the need to expand women's freedom of choice as an
act of empowerment).
146. For a discussion of how practical experience showed that in reality legal rights had
only limited impact, see Sally Engle Merry, Resistance and the Cultural Power ofLaw,
29 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 11, 21 (1995). Battered women may value the spousal tie and
life within the relationship much more than security and protection. Schneider at-
tempts to analyze the lessons of the Hawaiian model: rights may give women relief
from violence, but they fail to supply them with a framework to which they feel that
they can belong. For a wider discussion of the Hawaiian model, see ELIZABETH M.
SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 52 (2000). Baker adds
that if the law identifies this preference as a pathology or deviance it is because the
law has failed to assess how vital relationships are to our lives. See Baker, supra note
131, at 1463-64, 1477.
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violence is less frequent and severe ("common couple violence").14 7 Not-
withstanding that in relationships of the first type, leaving may be
perceived as the "right" step which women must be encouraged to take,
it is doubtful whether it will always be the ultimate measure.148 As Baker
notes, adoption of a norm of connection instead of a norm of autonomy
may explain why many women choose, and even prefer, not to leave as
the response to sporadic violence. 14,
A comparative look at each of the approaches shows that in the
limited context of domestic violence, at the heart of the dispute between
the radical and the cultural streams in feminist thinking is the position-
ing of women on one end of the victim-free agent dichotomous scale. A
significant body of feminist literature deals with the observation of the
conduct of women in difficult situations unique to them (such as prosti-
tution, pornography, violence) through two-dimensional lenses that
cannot encompass intermediate shades formed of partial choices or lim-
ited autonomy. Instead, they recognize only two opposing situations:
helplessness and victimization, or autonomy and free choice. While the
radical school of thought emphasizes the factors frustrating the autono-
mous conduct of women and establishes the image of helpless victims,
the cultural school of thought exposes the voluntary-independent ele-
ments in the conduct of battered women and portrays them as
"survivors"-an image associated with courage and power and not nec-
essarily with victimization." 0 The difference between the two approaches
is based on the diverging significance each accords to abstract concepts
such as "rationality" and "free choice." The radical stream accepts the
customary meaning given by liberal thinkers to the concepts of "choice"
and "autonomy" and attempts to portray women as victims who have
been deprived of the capacity to choose by society. In contrast, the cul-
tural stream challenges the liberal presumptions regarding the nature of
"choice" and "rationality" and attempts to instill meaning in these con-
cepts that will reflect insights from the life experiences of women.
Instead of recognizing activities designed to maximize personal benefit
as the exclusive valid expression of "rationality," the cultural stream seeks
to add a legitimate aspect to the interpretation of this term, namely,
147. Portwood, supra note 95, at 225-26.
148. Baker, supra note 92, at 465.
149. Baker, supra note 92, at 465.
150. See generally EDWARD GONDOLF & ELLEN FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HOPELESSNESS (1988); Martha Minow,
Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 141 (1993) (discussing the internal dispute
among feminists regarding the use of the "victim" discourse versus "survivor" dis-
course).
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activities designed to preserve the relationship with preference given to
cooperation and compromise.15' Acknowledging these activities as "ra-
tional" is necessary as part of the respect due to the differences between
the genders, and it is necessary in view of the moral and ethical views of
women that reflect their life experiences and unique needs.
An expression of the different point of view of the two streams is
reflected in the meaning that each ascribes to the metaphor of the voice.
Radical feminism uses this metaphor to emphasize how women are
silenced in society: comments made by women are sometimes treated
with scorn, women are portrayed as tale-tellers who create a negative
psychological incentive to hear them, and interested parties exert pres-
sure on women, thereby inspiring a false voice which does not express
their selfhood and authentic desires. Often, the "voice" is more than a
mere metaphor. It has been claimed that the law itself does not recog-
nize the unique voice of women, for example, by refusing to admit
hearsay evidence-which is evidence that reflects female patterns of
communication, such as when women share the secret of their arduous
experiences with other women.'52 A central motif borrowed from Marx-
ist theory and developed in radical writing is that of the "false
consciousness,"' where women themselves are incapable of recognizing
that they are victims. In a symposium held in 1984, Catharine A.
MacKinnon coined a famous metaphorical phrase to describe the inher-
ent inferiority of women who cannot identify their own true wishes:
151. Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78. VA. L. REV.
421, 449 (1992).
152. Fiona E. Raitt, Feminist Perspectives on Evidence, in GENDER BIAS IN HEARSAY RULE
59 (M. Childs & L. Ellison eds., 2000) (criticizing the rule prohibiting hearsay evi-
dence). See also Liz HALL & SIOBHAN LLOYD, SURVIVING CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
(1989).
153. The term "false consciousness" is central to Marxist philosophy, and reflects the lack
of compatibility between people's perceptions, values, worldviews, and ideologies and
their position in the social class system. Radical feminism borrowed the concept from
Marxist theory and developed its application in the context of gender inferiority and
inequality suffered by women in patriarchal society. The term seeks to challenge the
attempt by cultural feminism to revise the insights of traditional liberalism regarding
the significance of rationality, choice, and autonomy. The radical criticism holds that
the efforts to enrich the liberal theory with insights reflecting the life experiences of
women is destined to fail, because the feminist values represented by cultural femi-
nism are a modern reflection of the negative stereotypes of women which were
exploited for years to keep them inferior. The "false consciousness" reflects the inter-
nalization of the patriarchal values of women as victims to the extent that they
themselves are incapable of identifying their place as victims. See CATHARINE A.
MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 39 (1987); MAcKINNON, supra note 126, at
83-105 (discussing the development of "raising consciousness" as a remedy against
the problem of false consciousness).
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" [h]is foot is on her throat."'14 The metaphor clarifies why women can-
not have an authentic voice: the system is so sophisticated that it is
capable of blinding the eyes of women to their true wishes and causes
them to perceive the wishes of men as their own.
In contrast, cultural feminism uses the metaphor of the "voice" to
indicate the existence of a feminine voice which is insufficiently heard,
but which would benefit society if recognized alongside the masculine
voice. In the context of domestic violence against women, Carol M.
Rose attempts to show that women's choices to remain with their part-
ners is not necessarily irrational from their point of view.'5 On the
contrary, if the term "rational" is given meaning from a feminine per-
spective, we learn that this choice reflects the high subjective value they
accord the relationship in terms of their identity."' This choice is the
"other voice," and it reflects important values such as loyalty, coopera-
tion, concern, care, giving, sacrifice, persistence, and willingness to
compromise.
The one-dimensional perspective taken by each of the approaches
on the conduct of battered women has attracted criticism by scholars,
who have identified two general problems emerging from this theoreti-
cal analysis. One problem is referred to by the literature as the "double
bind effect," which reflects the tension between the need to find a
practical solution in the short run, which prefers a paternalistic and pro-
tective policy at the cost of denying the victim the autonomy of choice,
and a symbolic solution in the long run, which will improve the status
and image of the private victim and the category of victims to which she
belongs. On the legal level, the tension between the paternalistic ap-
proach and the empowering approach has a practical relevance in
determining the policy for treating domestic violence offenses at various
crossroads in the criminal process.' A second problem that has
154. Symposium, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law-A Conversation, 34
BUFF. L. REV. 11, 74-75 (1985).
155. Rose, supra note 151, at 449.
156. Rose, supra note 151, at 449.
157. Thus, for example, the setting of policy that deals with complaints made to the police
by victims who later withdraw their complaints is influenced by whether battered
women are perceived as "victims" or as "free agents." In contrast to Israel's "no drop"
policy which reflects a paternalistic point of view, in Minnesota (U.S.) the women's
requests are honored out of respect for, or at least as an acknowledgement of, the
practical disadvantages of disregarding their request, such as deterring abused women
from approaching and complaining to the authorities. A study of 480 cases of domes-
tic violence in Indiana (U.S.) found that a policy of mandatory prosecution, which
does not enable women to withdraw their complaint or refuse to testify, placed wom-
en in danger in certain cases. David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Criminal
Prosecution of Wife Assaulters: Process, Problems and Effects, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO
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attracted criticism for providing a one-dimensional perspective of the
conduct of women suffering from domestic violence is known in the
literature as the problem of essentialization."' This problem is common
in feminist writing, and is expressed by a sweeping characterization of
groups of women on the basis of a single common trait while disregard-
ing differences between them, reducing the individual woman to a one-
dimensional monolithic entity, and disregarding the multiple facets of
the individual.'" In the context of domestic violence, feminist writers
have sought to uncover the rich heterogeneity in the life stories of bat-
tered women.160 It is not surprising that battered women would choose
to act in different ways according to varying priorities.'6' The ethnic,
cultural, socioeconomic, and individual differences make the life stories
of each battered woman unique and necessitate a particular perception
in order to understand her world, wishes, and the meaning of her con-
duct.162
WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION 127, 150 (N. Zoe Hilton ed.,
1993). An additional practical expression of the tension between paternalism and au-
tonomy is seen in the determination of the proper policy regarding the imposition of
a duty to report to the police when a person has reasonable grounds for believing that
a woman suffering from violence is at risk and that woman refuses to turn to the au-
thorities for help. See generally Sandra Kopels & Jill D. Kagle, Do Social Workers Have
a Duty to Warn?, 67 Soc. SERV. REv. 101 (1993). The question of whether it is
worthwhile to adduce expert evidence on the battered wife syndrome has also raised
the double bind dilemma in the United States in criminal cases concerning battered
women who have killed their abusive husbands. See Mahoney, supra note 90, at 49.
158. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, in CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 261 (Richard Delgado ed., 2000); Heather
Nancarrow, Restorative Justice for Domestic and Family Violence: Hopes and Fears of
Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Australian Women, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND VIO-
LENCE AGAINST WOMEN 123, 129 (James Ptacek ed., 2010).
159. See Baker, supra note 131, at 1464; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Femi-
nist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990) (offering critiques of the problem of
feminist essentialism).
160. Baker, supra note 131; Jessica Dayton, The Silencing ofa Woman's Choice: Mandatory
Arrest and No Drop Prosecution Policies in Domestic Violence Cases, 9 CARDozo WoM-
EN'S L.J. 281 (2003).
161. Baker, supra note 131.
162. Baker, supra note 131 (describing how ethnic and cultural differences influence the
modes of conduct of battered women coming from different ethnic or cultural back-
grounds); Dayton, supra note 160, at 290-91 (describing her experiences dealing
with battered women and noting that immigrant women fear reporting abuse because
they fear being deported by the enforcement agencies). In Israel, women from collec-
tivist societies, such as Arab society or the ultra-Orthodox society, also fear to turn to
authorities outside their closed communities and a fortiori to the enforcement agen-
cies in which they have no confidence or trust. These communities have a need to
overcome cultural gaps and difficulties in accessing institutions and services, inter alia,
because of the existence of other beliefs and perceptions regarding the family unit and
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III. SHOULD CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE REQUEST OF WOMEN
LIVING UNDER THE SHADOW OF VIOLENCE TO IMPOSE LIGHTER
SENTENCES: THE DILEMMA FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A
ONE-DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS
If we return to the question whether consideration should be given
to the request of victims of domestic violence to impose more lenient
sentences on the violent assailants, we can conclude that both problems
related to the binary perception of the conduct of battered women are
also relevant. Each approach supports an unequivocal, binary policy
(considering or not considering the request), which places the abused
women within an inflexible category. This placement fails to recognize
the pluralistic nature of the women themselves, and equally fails to rec-
ognize intermediate solutions that reflect a flexible policy such as partial
consideration, based on an understanding of the motives of the individ-
ual woman in the context of her unique life story.
The radical school of thought would represent the prevailing une-
quivocal position denying consideration of the individual woman's
request to lighten her abuser's sentence. There are a number of reasons
for this. According to the radical approach, the patriarchal system
silences the true voice of women and, as noted, creates a "false con-
sciousness." The specific woman, seeking to lighten the punishment of
her abusive partner, is seen as blind to her true interests, as her con-
sciousness is false. Her unique psycho-social condition frustrates her
ability to escape the trap in which she finds herself and necessitates pa-
ternalistic intervention that will save her from the danger which she may
bring upon herself. Domestic violence victims who call for mercy for
abusive men are not using their true voice, but rather that of men. Con-
sidering a request for leniency in these circumstances would mean
silencing women's true hidden voice and subjecting them again to the
experience of loss of self, only this time under the auspices of the legal
system. Radical feminism would prefer in such a case to adopt a pater-
nalistic approach, seeking to deny the false voice and uncover the "true"
voice of women-a voice calling for a harsher sentence and tougher atti-
tude towards their partners. The legal system, as part of the
women's role in that unit. See generally Muhammad M. Haj-Yahia & Elisheva Sadan,
Issues in Intervention with Battered Women in Collectivist Societies, 34 J. MARITAL &
FAM. THERAPY 1 (2008).
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institutionalized social mechanism, bears the primary social responsibil-
ity for supplying women with maximum protection.163
Another fear is that allowing consideration to be given to a request
for mercy on the part of women might spur violent men to pressure
women during the legal process, so that the legal system would find it-
self collaborating in perpetuating the inferiority of women as well as
maintaining the social power gaps within the family, and perhaps even
escalating the level of violence. Donna Wills asserts, on the basis of
experience gathered as a prosecutor of domestic violence cases in Los
Angeles, that it is the norm for battered women to withdraw charges or
refuse to cooperate with the law enforcement authorities in domestic
violence cases.' This is caused by the tendency of violent men to en-
gage in manipulations intended to pressure and persuade women to
refrain from cooperating with the prosecution.' 6 ' The combination of
these two tendencies creates the risk that the criminal process will be
exploited and taken over by men if women's opinion is honored at the
various stages of the process. Countering the arguments calling for con-
sideration to be given to the victims' request as a means of empowering
them, Wills responds that in practice not only does this approach em-
power abusers, but it also gives them an incentive to engage in
163. For a comprehensive discussion regarding the responsibility of society to supply
women with protection, safety, and welfare, see Shadmi, supra note 128, 21-37.
Shadmi points to a change in the traditional perception of the state as responsible for
acts which it performed either directly or through its agents, but not for acts per-
formed by individuals, such as violence directed by men at women. In recent times,
this perception has shifted, and today the state is also regarded as responsible in cases
where it has systematically failed to bring parastatal agents or private individuals to
trial. Michele E. Beasley & Dorothy Q Thomas, Domestic Violence as a Human
Rights Issue, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF
DOMESTIC ABUSE 326-27 (M.A. Fineman & R. Roxanne eds., 1994). Shadmi ex-
plains that in order for the state to be regarded as responsible for the actions of
private individuals, its failure to enforce the law in these cases must ensue from pro-
hibited discrimination. See Shadmi, supra note 128 and accompanying text. With
regard to our discussion, we are not referring to failure to enforce the law on violent
men; our assumption is that the man has been tried and convicted. However, it is ar-
guable that the state's responsibility to supply safety and protection to women also
applies to the implementation of the law at the sentencing stage, which encapsulates
the practical essence of the concept of giving protection to women. For further dis-
cussion regarding the state's duty to create conditions which will enable women, like
men, to realize their right to personal security, see Uri Yanay, Personal Security and
the 'Right'to Protection, 40 Soc. POL'Y & ADMIN. 509 (2006).
164. Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA WoM-
EN'S L.J. 173, 177 (1997).
165. Id at 179-80.
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manipulative measures which endanger women, children, and the stabil-
ity and safety of society as a whole. '6 In contrast:
By proceeding with the prosecution with or without victim's
cooperation, the prosecutor minimizes the victim's value to the
batterer as an ally to defeat criminal prosecution. A "no drop"
policy means prosecutors will not allow batterers to control
the system of justice through their victims) 6 7
Even though Wills focuses on the "no drop" policy as a tool for prevent-
ing the abuser from engaging in manipulative measures during the trial,
these arguments are also applicable at the sentencing stage. Thus, refus-
ing to consider the apparently "irrational" request by women to lighten
the sentence of their violent partners is actually a device for protecting
them, preserving their dignity and creating a "protective space" for them
in which the dynamic of men controlling them will not succeed.
Another factor that supports rejecting a request for leniency is ex-
pressed in the well-known statement propounded by the radical school
of thought: "the personal is the political." This statement represents the
aspiration to transform the struggle against domestic violence from one
which is "private" into one that is public and advocates harsher sentenc-
es without taking into account the wish of a specific private victim to
deviate from the appropriate policy. As Schneider emphasizes, the use of
rhetoric which "privatizes" the phenomenon is one of the important
ideological obstacles threatening to frustrate reform in this area.16 By
characterizing the problem as a private one, the law makes it difficult to
shape the phenomenon as one for which every member of society bears
responsibility.1 6 ' According to this view, it is necessary to adopt an ap-
proach that goes beyond the private story of the specific couple and
relies on a collective social perspective: the inferior position of women in
society, including within the family. Thus, the only solution is to uncov-
er the "real" voice which has been silenced-one that seeks protection
from the violent man and a stern approach towards him.
This thinking reflects a preference for a policy that advances the
collective public interest of victims of domestic abuse over the individu-
al interests of private victims. The radical approach seeks to blur the
individual traits distinguishing one woman from another-traits that
might lead to differing preferences on the part of individual
166. Id.
167. Id. at 180.
168. SCHNEIDER, supra note 146, at 87.
169. Baker, supra note 131, at 1466.
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women-and instead, emphasize the aspect common to all: their vic-
timization. Likewise, conceiving the phenomenon of domestic violence
as one that endangers the peace and security of society as a whole is con-
sistent with the desire to follow an uncompromising policy that does
not take into account the wishes of the individual woman.co
Opposing the radical approach, cultural feminism seeks to examine
the wishes of individual women through the prism of the choice theory,
by giving due respect to their wishes, according weight to the life experi-
ence of the women and to the ethical concepts characterizing female
thinking, and accepting the huge importance attributed by women to
their relationships with their significant partners. This thinking prefers
solutions that take into account the needs and wishes of the individual
women, even if they seem hard to understand from the perspective of a
"bystander", and even if they clash with the collective interest. The cul-
tural approach relies on a non-judgmental perspective. Instead of
regarding the request as a means of silencing women, it seeks to recog-
nize the rationality and validity of the request from the ethical and
moral standpoint of the individual women. These women possess a scale
of values different from the liberal hierarchy of values which reflects the
one-dimensional, male viewpoint and is perhaps even different from the
hierarchy of values of other women whose life experiences has given
them different needs.
Feminist writers explain that if it is desired to supply battered
women with a solution adapted to their real life situation, it is necessary
to respect their choices, out of consideration for their needs, preferences,
and the individual cultural background of each woman."' Ziv explains
that
170. Wills writes extensively about the reasons why domestic violence is seen as a phenom-
enon that affects the security of the public as a whole. This phenomenon not only
causes injury to the victim, but also affects a very broad range of persons and bodies
who suffer from the ramifications of the acts, including "children, neighbors, extend-
ed family, the workplace, hospital emergency rooms, [and] good Samaritans who are
killed while trying to intervene." Wills, supra note 164, at 174. Accordingly, the state
has a legitimate and primary interest in conducting a strict and harsh policy to treat
this phenomenon. Wills, supra note 164, at 173-76. To show one state that has de-
termined that it is appropriate to give special attention to the trials of offenders
charged with domestic violence, Wills also cites section 273.8 of the California Penal
Code ("The Legislature hereby finds that spousal abusers present a clear and present
danger to the mental and physical well-being of the citizens of the State of Califor-
nia.") Wills, supra note 164, at 174 (alteration in original) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 273.8 (West 1988) (amended 1994)).
171. See, e.g., Dayton, supra note 160, at 286; Ephy Ziv, Politika Shel Alimoot Neged
Nashim [Politics of Violence Against Women], 22 Soc'Y & WELFARE 417, 428-29
(2003) (Isr.).
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the temptation and yearning to exclude our private and daily
confrontation with the patriarchal from our consciousness of-
ten leads us to define the people we are treating as different,
lacking in power, ignorant victims and incapable. In order to
allow the woman before us to identify and give voice [to her
wishes], we must assume, first, that she has a voice, and second
that her voice is admissible, valid and no less creative than our
voice. We must assume that before us is a woman (subject)
with powers and knowledge of her wishes, even if these were
temporarily removed and denied her in a swathe of violence
172
Disregarding the voice of women means imitating the policy fol-
lowed by the law towards child victims of abuse. If paternalism raises
difficulties regarding children, it does so even more acutely in the case of
adult autonomous women.m
Respecting women's requests for leniency is an empowering mech-
anism that is adapted to female ethical thinking. Giving voice is an act
of empowerment particularly where the experience of victimization en-
tails repression and control.1 7 ' The legal process, including sentencing,
has a psychological impact and accordingly can be a tool to empower
the victim and lessen the sense of repression.'7 ' The psychologist and
jurist Sharon Portwood eloquently describes the beneficial psychological
potential of the legal process:
172. See Ziv, supra note 171, at 428 (translated by the authors).
173. Feminist writing has often dealt with the rights of children out of a recognition of the
basic structural inequality and inferiority of both groups in the face of male power.
See CAROL SMART, WOMEN, CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE 89
(1976).
174. Dayton describes a study carried out in Indiana based on 480 cases of domestic vio-
lence in which a "no drop" policy was employed by the prosecution. The study found
that in some of these cases this policy harmed the woman. The woman felt empow-
ered when she was actively allowed to take action for herself. Giving the woman the
power to decide whether or not to withdraw the complaint was possibly her first op-
portunity to exert control over a relationship in which from the outset she was at a
great disadvantage. Dayton, supra note 160, at 289-90.
175. For further discussion regarding the therapeutic potential of the criminal process as a
healing device for battered women in general, and for women who have suffered sex-
ual abuse in particular, see Dancig-Rosenberg, supra note 33. For a general discussion
regarding the theory of the law as a healing device within the framework of therapeu-
tic jurisprudence and the implementation of this approach in cases of domestic
violence, see Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The "Comprehensive Law
Movement", 6 PEPP. Disr. RESOL. L.J. 1, 14 (2006).
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In thinking about formulating effective response to intimate
partner violence, one useful perspective is therapeutic juris-
prudence.. . . At its core, therapeutic jurisprudence simply
acknowledges that the law, broadly defined to include laws,
policies, procedures and the roles that individuals play within
the legal system, has a psychological impact. Sometimes law
causes psychological harm and sometimes it can have a
therapeutic effect. The goal of therapeutic justice is to maxim-
ize the psychological benefit of the law, as broadly defined,
while minimizing psychological harm."17
Elsewhere she adds: "[i]t's clear that the law can have a therapeutic im-
pact on female victims of violence if it's responsive to their needs." 7
In the spirit of Portwood's comments, the cultural approach seeks
to warn the court against committing the same wrong towards the
woman as the man-erasing the "self" and denying her subjective
will-out of a patronizing and condescending outlook that purports to
know it all. Instead, this approach advocates that women be made re-
sponsible for their own choices out of a sense of empathy and respect,
while being offered solutions which fall outside accepted conventional
thinking.'7 ' Linda G. Mills takes the view that it would now be appro-
priate to prefer an approach that recognizes the intimate and "private"
characteristics of domestic spousal violence.' Mills explains that it is
the identification of the unique aspects of the phenomenon that enables
conceptualization of more creative solutions that may be adapted to the
individual voices involved in each story. '8
176. Portwood, supra note 95, at 222.
177. Portwood, supra note 95, at 228.
178. Dayton, supra note 160, at 282-83 (describing how her experiences with battered
women strengthened her belief in the importance of respecting the woman's auton-
omy to make decisions affecting her own life). In Dayton's opinion, the woman's
decision at any given point in time is the best decision for her at that point in time.
Dayton, supra note 160, at 283. A paternalistic decision that does not take into ac-
count the specific circumstances of the woman ignores her needs and sends her the
crushing message that she does not know what is good for her and for her children,
and, even worse, could place her in real danger. Dayton, supra note 160, at 283.
179. See Ziv, supra note 171, at 428-29 (describing the manner in which she chose to
treat a religious woman who had suffered years of abuse from her husband as an ex-
ample of empathic aid, which is culturally sensitive and challenges paternalistic
thinking).
180. Linda G. Mills, Intimate Violence as Intimate: The Journey and a Path, 9 CARDozo
WOMEN'S L.J. 462, 462-63 (2003).
18 1. Id.
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In this context it should briefly be noted that although considera-
tions of retribution stemming from public condemnation and
commensurateness between the gravity of the offense and the severity of
the sentence apparently support rejection of the victim's request to light-
en the sentence of the offender, considerations of deterrence create a
dilemma. On the one hand, a harsher sentence contributes to the effect
of deterrence by creating a "balance of fear" in respect of the specific
defendant as well as potential defendants, and of course also sends an
educational message of deterrence in its positive sense to the general
public. Wills takes the view that a sentence of imprisonment is a legiti-
mate tool to persuade a man to fully consider in advance whether it is
worth his while to act violently towards his spouse.182 It therefore follows
that no consideration should be given to the victim's request for lenien-
cy.
On the other hand, the deterrence interest is also influenced by the
efficacy of the sentence and by the certainty of enforcement, i.e., by the
tendency of women to complain to the authorities. Accordingly, par-
ticularly with regard to offenses that suffer from under-reporting, giving
consideration to the victim's request for leniency may contribute to the
deterrence effect by acting as a positive incentive to battered women to
turn to the enforcement agencies. This is therefore an interesting utili-
tarian analysis of incentives, where the final outcome is increased
deterrence although the manner of achieving this involves the dilemma
of how best to act in cases where requests for leniency are advanced by
women.
Likewise, from the classical perspective of sentencing considerations
of prevention and protection of the victim, the dilemma is not simple.
On the one hand, harsher sentencing is intended to provide immediate
protection for women by removing violent men from their proximity in
order to enable women to rehabilitate. Indeed, Wills explains that a
strict policy is essential to the protection of women:
Sentencing batterers to jail does not endanger victims; batter-
ers who believe there is no higher authority than themselves
endanger victims. . . . Even if jail doesn't guarantee rehabilita-
tion, we would certainly rather incarcerate batterers than
continue to "intern" their victims by forcing them into shelters
to be safe."'
182. Wills, supra note 164, at 181.
183. Wills, supra note 164, at 180. Hanna notes that there is no empirical support for the
assumption that more severe sentencing poses a greater risk to women. Cheryl Hanna,
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On the other hand, there have been cases where there is a real fear
that harsher sentences, and in particular custodial sentences, might in-
crease the anger of violent men and consequently cause them to harm
women at the first available opportunity.' Dayton emphasizes that as
long as the state is not able to guarantee the safety of women, women
cannot be made subject to a paternalistic regime that forces them to co-
operate with the policy chosen by the prosecution,' thereby exposing
them to a real risk upon the men returning home after being acquitted
or following completion of their sentence."' What should be done,
therefore, in this paradoxical situation, when the sentence-which is
intended to protect women-actually puts them at risk?
IV. TOWARDS A MULTIDIMENSIONAL MODEL THAT RECOGNIZES
FEMALE DIVERSITY-A VICTIM REPORT
How should we try and resolve the dilemma of whether to consider
a victim's request for leniency without applying a solution that falls
within the inflexible victim-free agent dichotomy, but instead adapts to
specific women and their unique life stories?
Initially, it is necessary to contemplate the distinction between a re-
quest for leniency during pre-conviction stages, i.e., a request to
withdraw a complaint made to the police, and a request for leniency
during the sentencing stage, such as a request for leniency upon convic-
tion, or a request for a charge to be dropped or replaced with a more
moderate one.
Arguably, at the conviction and earlier stages there is justification
for not giving consideration to women's requests for leniency, as the
conviction entails moral condemnation and stigmatization of the acts
attributed to the defendant."' Adopting a "no drop" policy at the in-
dictment stage not only guarantees that a stern condemnatory message
is sent to the defendant about the manner in which his conduct is per-
ceived by society, but also sends a message to society itself. As noted,
The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1505, 1557 (1998).
184. Wills, supra note 164, at 179.
185. Dayton, supra note 160, at 289.
186. See Linda G. Mills, Intuition and Insight: A New Joh Description for the Battered
Woman's Prosecutor and Other More Modest Proposals, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 183,
191 (1997).
187. This statement is not obvious. In other offenses we find that the forgiveness of the
victims is sometimes taken into account versus the public interest in charging the of-
fender.
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these messages underpin our view regarding the activity of the criminal
law and the justification for sentencing. The very use of the criminal
process has an ancillary value in the form of deterring violent men, who
typically do not acknowledge the criminality of their acts and tend to
activate defensive psychological mechanisms of rationalization, mini-
malization, and casting responsibility onto external factors.' If it was
not for the pursuit of an "aggressive" policy that refused to take into ac-
count the clear tendency of battered women to withdraw complaints
made to the police, the phenomenon would often remain completely
outside the coercive external handling of society. Considering women's
requests to withdraw a charge at such an early stage of the criminal pro-
cess would inevitably thwart the possibility of sending the message of
condemnation and repugnance that accompanies the indictment of an
offender. Unlike the sentencing stage, the indictment stage symbolizes
the beginning of the criminal process. If the process were not to begin at
all, the state's intervention would not be seen as sending a sufficiently
assertive and condemnatory social message."'
The difference between the sentencing stage and the preceding
stages may justify an approach that actually supports giving substantive
and influential weight to the judgment and needs of the victim at the
sentencing stage.o90 First, unlike the position at the indictment stage,
which is based on a binary decision to accept the victim's wishes and not
try the offender, or to disregard her wishes and try the offender, the sen-
tencing stage is completely within the discretion of the court, regarding
188. See Wills, supra note 164 (describing a range of factors supporting the adoption of a
"no drop" policy when charging an offender with domestic violence). Hanna sup-
ports a policy whereby charges are brought against defendants against whom there is
solid evidence, irrespective of the victim's wishes. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose:
Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 1 IARV. L. REV.
1849, 1867-68 (1996). An advantage of indictments that do not take into account
the woman's wishes lies in the ability to testify about the public aspect of domestic
violence offenses. Id. at 1907-08. Hanna is aware that the price of an aggressive pros-
ecution policy is reduced female autonomy. Id. at 1856. Hanna states that in certain
cases, a woman must be compelled to testify against her will in order to remove any
incentive for the man to threaten her.
189. See Eisenstat, supra note 3 (supporting the presumption that the state has a greater
interest at the indictment and determination of guilt stages, and that it would not be
appropriate for the victim to have independent standing during these stages).
190. Comments made by Wills, who vehemently supports the adoption of a "no drop"
policy at the pre-conviction stages, indicate that she too does not reject the possibility
of compromise with respect to giving consideration to victim's needs or wishes at the
sentencing stage. Wills, supra note 164, at 179 ("[P]rosecutors have learned from the
carnage and despair we have witnessed in domestic violence cases that victims cannot
afford to forgive and forget and that the only thing worth negotiating is how much
incarceration and how much mandated counseling is necessary to stop the batterer.").
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both the preliminary question as to whether to take the victim's wishes
into account, and the extent to which her request should be considered
and the manner in which this consideration should influence the struc-
ture of the sentence. The court could adopt an intermediate path of
partial or qualified consideration for the wishes of the victim. The judge
has the choice of placing the offender on probation, and if he breaches
his probation he can be subjected to imprisonment. Likewise, the judge
could hand down a suspended sentence of imprisonment.
Second, once retribution and deterrence are achieved in accordance
with the system described here-a system that rejects a request for leni-
ency at pre-sentencing stages-the factors favoring giving consideration
to the wishes of the victim at the sentencing stage take over, because
women will then suffer the practical consequences and impact of the
sentence directly and immediately. This is unlike the situation with oth-
er types of offenses, where the victim and the assailant are strangers, or
at least do not maintain an intimate and intensive relationship, where it
has sometimes been argued that in order to justify hearing the victim,
proof must first be adduced regarding the benefit which the victim
might gain by punishing the defendant."'
Third, it is arguable that the substantive impact of the criminal
process on the life and needs of women is expressed in practical terms at
the sentencing stage, as the ignominy accompanying the conviction is
essentially symbolic and it is only sentencing which gives it concrete ex-
pression within the framework of a material sanction. This argument
turns the policy of considering the wishes of the victim at the sentencing
stage into a tool that provides women with an incentive to turn to the
legal system, including in a system that adopts a "no drop" policy at pre-
sentencing stages. Refusing to consider the wishes of female victims at
the most critical and meaningful stage of their life-the sentencing
stage-might sway them from launching criminal proceedings in the
first place, and thereby prevent the coercive intervention of the criminal
law at the early stages of the indictment process and subsequently-
conviction. As noted, these stages are of a symbolic and deterrent value
that cannot be denied, and may also, of course, be accompanied by a
very important rehabilitative element. Upon sentencing the courts will
frequently ponder whether to adopt recommendations for rehabilitation
or treatment or pursue harsher sentences.192
From this point of view, we offer a solution that breaks out of the
dichotomous thinking customarily adopted by feminist literature re-
191. Hurd, supra note 7, at 407-08.
192. It should be emphasized that we are not concerned here with the empirical question
regarding the best way to prevent future acts of domestic violence.
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garding the perception of women living under the shadow of violence as
either victims or free agents. This dichotomy disguises the difference
among the life experiences of individual battered women. It relies on the
uncritical acceptance of the concept of a person's personal identity as
being a stable and permanent matter which could be distilled into a sin-
gle, central trait: victimization or autonomy.' In practice, as we have
tried to show, the attempt to portray women as always meeting one of
the two alternative descriptions-victim or free agent-fails to accurate-
ly explain the complex realities of women's life experiences.9 4 As Baker
notes: "The reality lies somewhere in between."' In view of this insight,
scholars have suggested replacing the binary approach to autonomy and
repression with a resolution-sensitive approach that would recognize the
scale of situations and integrate the concurrent differing limitations and
levels of autonomy in the lives of women.'
Based on Hannah Arendt's approach, Leora Bilsky suggests the de-
velopment of a new theory of independence designed to replace the
atomistic concept of "the liberal me" with a concept of independent
identity which is largely shaped within the public sphere of discourse
and interpersonal activity.'9 7 Erella Shadmi also adopts an interpretive
framework that rejects both the presumption of women's autonomy
and the concept of their powerlessness as an inevitable outcome of
being terrorized. Shadmi presents a number of solutions for rejecting
193. Minow, supra note 150, at 1432-33.
194. SCHNEIDER, supra note 146, at 82.
195. Baker, supra note 131, at 1465 (emphasis added).
196. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminism and the False Dichotomy of Victimization and Agen-
cy, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 387, 389 (1993). Abrams joins the call to replace the
simplistic binary approach with one that recognizes that the actions of a woman are
an outcome resulting from partial autonomy. Kathryn Abrams, Songs ofInnocence and
Experience: Dominance Feminism in the University, 103 YALE L.J. 1533, 1556-57
(1994) (reviewing KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR AND FEMINISM
ON Caus (1993)).
197. Bilsky, supra note 91, at 51-52. The author relies on an analysis offered by Arendt in
order to explain human action as comprised of three elements: plurality, which is ex-
pressed by multiple perspectives with respect to every human action; natality, which
is expressed by freedom of human action that enables us to act in an unexpected and
original manner; and narrativity, which is expressed in a continuous process of creat-
ing relationships, traditions, and stories that make up human society. This complex
view of human action contradicts the dichotomous framework that perceives auton-
omy and victimization as being mutually exclusive and instead enables an
understanding of the establishment of the "self' as a continuing process where the
identity of the "self' is not stable, but contemporaneously contains elements of au-
tonomy and victimization.
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the binary opposition between victimization and power,'" and examines
the mutual relations between limitations and freedom in the lives of ter-
rorized women, while shifting the focal point to the public sphere, i.e.,
to the responsibilities of society, its institutions, and its members."
The solution we propose seeks to pursue this critical trend and of-
fers a practical tool for dealing with the question at the heart of this
Article. We propose using the device known as a "victim report" as a
means of informing the court of the victim's suffering and her wishes,
explaining the concrete reasons for the specific woman's request for a
more lenient sentence to be imposed on her assailant.200 Our practical
experience gained from meeting women living in the shadow of violence
has shown that a variety of factors may motivate women to ask for leni-
ency. These factors range from internal-subjective issues stemming from
deep and genuine feelings of love for the man,2' to practical constraints
such as the woman's financial situation and concern for her children and
for the unity of the family,2 02 to emotions of fear or a sense of being
198. Shadmi, supra note 128, at 21-22. One solution is Mahoney's suggestion that do-
mestic violence be viewed as a struggle for "power and control." Shadmi, supra note
128, at 21 (citing Mahoney, supra note 90, at 28, 60). Within this framework, wom-
en are portrayed as active agents when they express confidence in the future of their
relationships and decide to continue with their marriages. A second solution relies on
a new understanding of autonomy. As the objective is to transform the mutual de-
pendence between the citizen and the state to support for autonomy, she calls for
women to be genuinely involved in making decisions about their future. Shadmi, su-
pra note 128, at 21. A third solution relies on a new understanding of victimization:
"the recognition of victimization enables women to know what we are facing," i.e.,
recognition of victimization enables feminist handling of male control and violence.
Shadmi, supra note 128, at 22 (translated by the authors).
199. Shadmi, supra note 128, at 30.
200. This idea is also consistent with Eisenstat's writings and the view that in order to
examine the morality behind the victim's desire for revenge, it is necessary to consider
her motives. See Eisenstat, supra note 3, at 1123.
201. Many women speak of feelings of love, dependence, and nostalgia for the man in
their lives. Love has the power to hurt, while simultaneously creating the strength to
suffer through pain. A well-known study by J.J. Gayford of 100 battered women in
England showed that among the common reasons for their staying in a violent rela-
tionship were feelings of love and loyalty to the man. Twenty-one percent of the
women reported that they had feelings of love or affection towards their violent part-
ners. J.J. Gayford, Wife Bartering: A Preliminary Survey of 100 Cases, 25 BRIT. MED.
J. 194 (1975). This reason is often doubted by the courts, which find it difficult to
comprehend ambivalent messages such as "can't live with him, can't live without
him" and instead wonder, "how can a woman really love someone who causes her
suffering?"
202. There are women who fear that their family will fall apart in the absence of the man
and seek to give the children a father figure in the home, particularly in cases where
the man does not direct his violence towards the children, but only towards the
woman. Economic factors may also sway the woman to ask for a more lenient sen-
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threatened or pressured by the man as part of the dynamic of control
which do not reflect the genuine and sincere internal will of the wom-
an. 03 Identifying a woman's motives for her request for leniency and
describing them in a thorough victim report may therefore help to de-
termine what weight should be accorded to her requests in her particular
case. For example, a request ensuing from a genuine internal subjective
wish stemming from love for the man and based on the hope of improv-
ing the family situation may justify greater consideration than a request
ensuing from feelings of fear stemming from threats and pressure exert-
ed by the man on the woman. These factors do not, of course, eliminate
the separate difficulty mentioned earlier, relating to the high risk possi-
bly posed by the man that may create a fear that harsher punishment
would endanger the woman. To this one must add the importance of
the victim report as a therapeutic legal device, by providing the victim
with a sense that the legal system recognizes her as a person and listens
to her wishes. An additional ancillary benefit may be gained from the
cumulative lessons taught by these reports in an area which is still largely
shrouded in uncertainty.04
The great value of the solution offered here lies, therefore, in the
fact that it is not positioned at one of the extremes of the dichotomy of
autonomy-paternalism, but rather integrates the advantages of each ap-
proach while adapting them to the circumstances of the specific case and
the possible variations in the life stories of the different women. This
solution recognizes the limitations of a sweeping concept of the needs of
women and their life experiences, a concept which purports to place all
women in one category, and instead suggests that recognition be given
to a wide spectrum of needs and female life experiences, based on which
modes of intervention and levels of consideration will be chosen in the
tence. In many cases the man is the sole breadwinner and the woman fears that the
family's living standards will worsen if the man is incarcerated and forced to stop
working.
203. In some (rare) cases of a "forgiving victim," we can say that the victim believes that
forgiveness is a more exalted value than revenge, and in forgiving the abuser the vic-
tim displays moral superiority in the face of his lack of morality.
204. For the statement that there is insufficient information regarding the range of reasons
and range of sentences, and that the system often acts on the basis of mistaken as-
sumptions regarding the efficiency of therapy versus the lack of benefit from
incarceration, see Hanna, supra note 183, at 1507. Hanna criticizes the fact that in
certain places in the United States, there is a tendency to refer cases of domestic vio-
lence to therapy instead of sentencing within the framework of the criminal system,
when it is not empirically clear that this course of action is effective in terms of pre-
venting future violence. Hanna sees this as a response to the sexist perception of
domestic violence as a private matter and therefore outside the ambit of the criminal
justice system. Hanna, supra note 183, at 1508.
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concrete case. Likewise, the solution recognizes the complexity of situa-
tions of domestic violence, which is not resolved at a given moment or
even limited to a particular defendant and victim. Thus, the solution
proposed here seeks to limit the problem of essentialism: it may be that
it would be appropriate to strongly consider the request of one woman
yet reach the opposite conclusion in other cases. Moreover, even in the
specific case, the court would not inevitably have to adopt a paternalistic
approach of complete consideration versus no consideration whatsoever.
A victim report explaining the situation of the specific woman and
the nature of her unique relationship with her partner could lead to the
conclusion that it would be appropriate to consider her request but sub-
ject to qualifications (for example, when practical constraints are at the
root of her request to lighten the sentence). It is also possible that if
women are given the opportunity to freely explain their situation and
their wishes (which is not the situation on the witness stand), the judge
would find that this wish is not one-dimensional. Similarly in respect of
victims seeking a harsher sentence, a victim report may sometimes reveal
that in fact the victim's aspiration is different. This is the case, for exam-
ple, when a victim asks a defendant to take responsibility for his acts, or
when she particularly wants the court to confirm her status as a vic-
. 205tim.
A number of practical methods are recognized globally for convey-
ing the victim's wishes to the court during the sentencing stage: one
205. For testimony that shows that sometimes victims are not interested in harsher sen-
tences per se but rather in the court's recognition of their injuries and that the
defendants take responsibility, see Yanay's study on "victim reports" in sex offenses,
Yanay, supra note 65. The study examined the use of the report and its impact on
various relevant bodies and it included 52 cases of sex offenses in which a victim re-
port was submitted. The findings of the report show that there are victims who
regard the portrayal of their pain in court, otherwise than as witnesses, as an im-
portant stage that is designed to enable them to feel that justice has been done in
their case. Yanay, supra note 65, at 256. A number of victims stated that it was im-
portant to them for the court to define them as victims and charge their assailants.
Using this distinction the court helped them to acquit themselves of the confusion
that had characterized them-the fear that perhaps they had caused the offenses
committed on them. Some regarded this determination as legitimization of their suf-
fering. The victim testimony is informative regarding the validity and importance of
the message theory in a multi-dimensional framework, which enables recognition of
the needs of the victim, on one hand, by sending a message to the defendant and to
the community (by means of the court), and on the other hand, receiving back an
important message from the community (by means of the court) regarding recogni-
tion of the injury. Here the study emphasizes the value of the report as a therapeutic
tool within the legal system.
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method is the submission of a victim's impact statement,206 a second
method is to call the victim as a witness upon sentencing, a third meth-
od is the submission of a victim report.207 In our view, the third method
is the most appropriate.
Our remarks might lead to the conclusion that we support the di-
rect testimony of the victim, but we believe that a victim report offers a
better solution, because direct testimony at the sentencing stage has a
number of disadvantages. First, the testimony of the victim at the pre-
sentencing stage will not always inform the court of the real wishes of
the victim; these wishes are often only uncovered following thorough
inquiry by a professional who investigates her motives and the back-
ground circumstances surrounding the relationship of the couple.
Second, the direct testimony of the victim is dependent on the discre-
tion of the party summoning her. Third, the testimony of the victim in
court may lead to a confrontation between her and the defendant. The
knowledge that she must testify, while facing her assailant, may impair
her willingness and ability to speak openly, sincerely, and starkly. Like-
wise, a victim's impact statement is undermined by the fact that the
court is not in a position to inquire into the background to the state-
ment and the sincerity of her request. Moreover, not only is the impact
statement made in writing, but if defense counsel chooses not to
cross-examine the victim, the court will not be able to gain a personal
impression of the victim.
Unlike the other options described above, there are many ad-
vantages to a victim report. First and foremost, the report sets out the
victim's statement and her story on the basis of her willingness to coop-
erate, and thereby enables the court to comprehensively examine the
injury and its circumstances, hear the story of her suffering, and find a
solution which will be more realistic and compatible with her needs.208
206. For a survey of the position around the world regarding victim impact statements, as
well as criticism and support for this approach, see Edna Erez, Victim Participation in
Sentencing: And the Debate Goes on, 3 INT'L REV. OF VICTIMOLOGY 17 (1994); Erez,
supra note 24, at 545-56; Leslie Sebba, Will the "Victim Revolution" Trigger a Reori-
entation ofthe Criminal Justice System?, 31 ISRAEL L. REv. 379 (1997).
207. The purpose of the submission of a victim report is to inform the court of objective
data regarding the condition of the victim, in order to allow the court to weigh this
data among the other factors to be considered upon sentencing. For a description of
the "victim report" around the world, see Yanay, supra note 65, at 240-44.
208. We should recall our earlier remarks regarding the importance of recognizing suffer-
ing that makes it vital to hear the victim. In this context, Meirav proposed an
interesting theory to the effect that learning gained from human suffering and emo-
tion is a tool for understanding the power and importance of a lost value for that
person. Meirav explains how suffering regarding the loss of something of value for a
victim (for abused women this may be, for example, the self, dignity, a sense of
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At the same time, being prepared by a professional, a report would allow
the court a more objective, penetrating look at the injury and its cir-
cumstances 0.20 The writer of the report is a professional social worker
with an understanding and experience of the complexity of the material,
and he or she must be trained to identify the motives of the woman in
the concrete case.210 Furthermore, the report is prepared outside the
court and the victim need not confront the defendant inside the court-
room. Alongside the factual description which must be scrutinized by
the probation service, the victim may express her view regarding the ap-
propriate sentence, while the professional may inquire into the factors
leading her to this conclusion, including her environment and similar
relevant circumstances. Thus, a victim report will best and most suitably
express the sentencing theory advocated in the first part of this Article,
well-being, or personal safety) is the manner in which that value is perceived. It fol-
lows that suffering is a tool for understanding the meaning of the lost value-a
person listening to the story of one who has experienced loss imagines how feelings of
loss are experienced, but only if he listens sympathetically and allows his emotions to
be awakened. Meirav, supra note 17, at 452 53. According to Meirav, when listening
to a story that expresses suffering regarding a violation of values (for example, when
listening to the story of the suffering of battered women or their impact statements
during sentencing), the listener (in our case-the court) may achieve a deeper under-
standing and empathy for the lost value, an understanding which would not have
come about through "cold" (emotionless) thinking, however focused and intense.
Meirav, supra note 17, at 452. These emotions may, for example, sway the judge to
be more attentive and invest greater intellectual effort in untangling the problematic
knot before him (instead of choosing the "easy" route of dryly implementing the law,
without attempting to adapt or at least bend it, by applying it in a sensitive manner to
the specific case). The job of narrating the victim's story entails highlighting the val-
ues violated from her point of view, and for the judge-understanding the
dimensions and quality of the loss. In contrast, the function of the defendant's state-
ment is to highlight those same values from a different perspective by describing the
values that were violated from the point of view of the defendant himself. Meirav, su-
pra note 17, at 483. The theory enables us to explain how these declarations may
allow each party to perceive the sentence as more just. If it is clear both to the victim
and to the defendant that the sentence is given out of a clear understanding of the
meaning of the values which were harmed in the life of the victim, and despite them,
and out of a clear assessment of the values which were or will be harmed in the life of
the defendant, and despite them-it is likely that neither would regard the sentence
as unjust. Meirav, supra note 17, at 480.
209. Thus, provision of a victim report precludes the serious criticisms raised against vic-
tim impact statements, to the effect that victims may report about their injuries and
emotions without any verification. Whiteley herself rejected the idea of a victim's im-
pact statement. Whiteley, supra note 28, at 50-52.
210. In our view, the combination of legal bodies and social workers is critical in these
types of cases. See Hanna, supra note 183, at 1553 (regarding prosecutors who are in-
censed when they fear that they will also be given therapeutic functions in cases of
domestic violence).
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i.e., transfer messages between the victim, the community and the de-
fendant, regarding the injury and the wishes of the victim. 211 Moreover,
hearing the voice of the victim through the submission of materials will
help the victim to cope with this painful process. Thus, accepting a re-
port, in contrast to the adoption of the model of direct testimony,
reflects a moderate balance between safeguarding the victim's rights and
those of the defendant. Accordingly, we believe that the report should be
the default option in cases of domestic violence, and that the court
should order the preparation of such a report in all cases prior to sen-
tencing (of course, only with the agreement of the victim).
Naturally, we are aware of the fact that even this proposed model is
not completely free of difficulties. A certain problem may ensue from
the fact that the court is entitled to order the (sudden) preparation of a
report. If we recall that the report may contain contentions based on
facts, it is possible that the victim will not be summoned to testify to
them. In addition, if the model is adopted it would require trust to be
placed in the writers of the report, their professionalism and evaluative
skills. These professionals may give expression to their own views within
the framework of their activities and take a paternalistic approach, or
have a stereotypical or biased worldview. Nonetheless, the latter prob-
lem is not confined to this context, and it may be seen in every
211. In addition to the many advantages offered by the report as a legal tool, Yanay identi-
fies non-legal benefits; including among these benefits are contact between the victim
and the professional social worker, as well as the opportunity to bring to the forefront
the details of the serious event, but in an environment which is protected and em-
pathic and helps the victim examine the facts through the appropriate perspective and
with professional counseling. Yanay, supra note 65, at 265. The writers of the report
are trained not only to receive the data so as to allow them to write the report for the
court, but also-and more particularly-to help the victim cope with the issues aris-
ing during the writing of the report. This important aspect is clearly reflected in the
comments of one of the writers of reports: " 'In my opinion, the help to the victim
lies not only in the preparation of the report as a final product, but in the process it-
self: the ability of the writer of the report to be there for the victim, to listen, to be
connected without withdrawing, becoming detached, defensive or defending-forms
part of the process itself, which in my view, makes a significant contribution to the
victims, well before the report reaches the court and irrespective of its implications
for the sentence.' " Yanay, supra note 65, at 265-66. In domestic violence offenses
the value of these benefits is huge. There are those who fear the possible negative im-
pact which the preparation of the report and its submission in court may have on the
victim. This fear stems from the fact that preparation of the report sometimes leads to
a loss of the equilibrium that the victim has managed to achieve. Additionally, occa-
sionally it is better for the victim that the court is seen to sentence the convicted
defendant without the victim "interfering" in its deliberations. The victim's possible
impact on the sentence may ultimately place her under a heavy emotional burden. See
id. at 267.
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situation involving a professional mediator who reports to the court.
One way of dealing with this problem is, for example, to devote part of
the report to quoting the victim in her own words, and separating this
section from the evaluation section written by the writer of the report.
Likewise, emphasis should be placed on the professional training of the
writers of the reports. Comprehensive training, including increased
alertness to the flaws that may be uncovered within the context of the
document as a result of personal bias, prejudices, or inclinations, may
also help to alleviate this fear.
V. INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION
We have no doubt that giving standing to the victim at the sentenc-
ing stage poses a problem for the legal system as it introduces a new
human element into the picture. This is a system in which the judges
and juries are accustomed to focus on the defendant while the argu-
ments set forth by the prosecution are usually abstract and do not
include the testimony of the victim or a victim impact statement. In our
opinion, this increased pressure is not only justified by the concepts
which we have sought to advocate in this Article, but is also essential at
this stage of the development of the criminal justice system and in view
of the fear of the loss of public confidence in this system. Moreover, the
advantage of such pressure is that it can exert leverage to ensure a deeper
study of the issue of domestic violence. Recognition of the sentencing
stage as "the individual justice stage," in contrast to the structured de-
termination of culpability stage, is imbued with real meaning when the
justice targets not only the defendant but also the victim. The tension
between victimization and autonomy that is uncovered by the analysis
of issues affecting women suffering from violence may actually have a
positive outcome as it is capable of reminding us of the complexity of
human actions: instead of adapting the stories of battered women to
existing legal checkboxes, it may be necessary to adjust the checkboxes
to the complex stories of partial autonomy.
Our proposal seeks to adapt the checkboxes to the complex stories
of partial autonomy and variations existing between different women,
using a theoretical format that gives a role to victims of crime during the
sentencing stage and recognizing the unique aspects of victims of do-
mestic violence. Our proposal offers a resolution mechanism that is
sensitive to the balance between the different considerations and diverts
the focus from the contents of the request per se (to lighten the sen-
tence) towards a spectrum of various motives for the request, such as
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fear, love, the desire not to harm children and family, and practical con-
siderations such as economic dependence. These motives vary among
different women depending on their personal stories. Transferring atten-
tion from the issue of the content of the request to the motive
underlying the request that the assailant be given a more lenient sen-
tence may allow the proper weight to be assigned to each request in any
given case, by taking into account the entire spectrum of considerations
on either side of the double-edged sword. Sharpening the resolution so
as to allow the motive for the request to be identified may bring to light
and prioritize considerations that would benefit women and be adjusted
to their concrete case, and will contribute, on a macro-level, to the crim-
inal justice system. Our proposal should be also considered in the
context of other types of offenses taking place within the domestic rela-
tionship. t

